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Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

Decision Theory And Antitrust: Quantitative Evaluation For Efficient Enforcement, Ira Horowitz Jul 1977

Decision Theory And Antitrust: Quantitative Evaluation For Efficient Enforcement, Ira Horowitz

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Price Discrimination Law And Economic Efficiency, Edward H. Cooper May 1977

Price Discrimination Law And Economic Efficiency, Edward H. Cooper

Michigan Law Review

The Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. ยง 13), undertakes to outlaw price "discrimination" upon proof of threatened injury to competition, and subject to specified defenses. Lawyers often bewail the fact that administration of this statute frequently fails to conform to an economist's notion of discrimination. For the most part, the complaints are addressed to the clear fact that, as drafted and interpreted, the statute wreaks unnecessary damage. In the name of protecting competition, competition and economic efficiency are often curtailed.


Socking It To Plaintiffs: Supreme Court Antitrust Decisions In 1976-77 Term, Jeff Miles Jan 1977

Socking It To Plaintiffs: Supreme Court Antitrust Decisions In 1976-77 Term, Jeff Miles

University of Richmond Law Review

Those persons who delve into the sometimes esoteric and sometimes shockingly practical world of the antitrust laws have noticed a markedly increased emphasis on both private and public enforcement efforts in recent years. One need look no further than the attacks against groups once thought to be immune, I action by Congress, and substantially increased state enforcement to see a vigorous movement to assure that no violation goes unnoticed and unpunished, and that private parties are compensated three-fold for injuries suffered by reason of illegal anticompetitive activity.


Antitrust - Private Actions - Treble Damages - Group Boycott - No-Switching Agrements Among Competitors Is A Per Se Offense - Plaintiff Who Failed To Gain Employment Thereby Is Injured Within His Business Or Property And States A Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted, J. Kurt Straub Jan 1977

Antitrust - Private Actions - Treble Damages - Group Boycott - No-Switching Agrements Among Competitors Is A Per Se Offense - Plaintiff Who Failed To Gain Employment Thereby Is Injured Within His Business Or Property And States A Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted, J. Kurt Straub

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.