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Elected Judges And Statutory Interpretation, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Ethan J. Leib Oct 2012

Elected Judges And Statutory Interpretation, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Ethan J. Leib

Faculty Publications

This Article considers whether differences in methods of judicial selection should influence how judges approach statutory interpretation. Courts and scholars have not given this question much sustained attention, but most would probably embrace the “unified model,” according to which appointed judges (such as federal judges) and elected judges (such as many state judges) are supposed to approach statutory text in identical ways. There is much to be said for the unified model—and we offer the first systematic defense of it. But the Article also attempts to make the best case for the more controversial but also plausible contrary view: that …


Hierarchy And Heterogeneity: How To Read A Statute In A Lower Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl Mar 2012

Hierarchy And Heterogeneity: How To Read A Statute In A Lower Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Faculty Publications

Is statutory interpretation an activity that all courts should perform the same way? Courts and commentators implicitly so conclude. I believe that conclusion is wrong. Statutory interpretation is a court-specific activity that should differ according to the institutional circumstances of the interpreting court. The U.S. Supreme Court is not the model all other courts should emulate.

I identify three kinds of institutional differences between courts that bear on which interpretive methods are appropriate: (1) the court’s place in the hierarchical structure of appellate review, (2) the court’s technical capacity and resources, and (3) the court’s democratic pedigree, particularly as reflected …


Corporate Governance: The Swedish Solution, George W. Dent Jan 2012

Corporate Governance: The Swedish Solution, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

Sweden has changed its corporate governance system by delegating the nomination of corporate directors (and thus, in effect, ultimate control) to committees typically comprising representatives of each company’s largest shareholders. This system gives shareholders a degree of power “that only the most daring corporate governance initiatives in the rest of the world could even imagine.” By all accounts the change has been successful; no one is complaining about it.

In the United States investors have long been kept weak in corporate governance for fear that giving them a major role would damage corporations in numerous ways. The Swedish experience seems …