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Through The Looking Glass To A Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law And Financial Regulation, Gillian E. Metzger
Through The Looking Glass To A Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law And Financial Regulation, Gillian E. Metzger
Faculty Scholarship
Administrative law and financial regulation have an uneasy relationship today. It was not always so. Indeed, the two were closely intertwined at the nation's birth. The Treasury Department was a major hub of early federal administration, with Alexander Hamilton crafting the first iterations of federal administrative law in his oversight of revenue generation and customs collection. One hundred and fifty years later, administrative law and financial regulation were conjoined in the New Deal's creation of the modern administrative state. This time it was James Landis, Chair of the newly formed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and author of the leading …
Mome In Hindsight, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Mome In Hindsight, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Faculty Scholarship
Two decades ago, the Virginia Law Review published our article “The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency” (MOME), in which we tried to discern the institutional underpinnings of financial market efficiency. We concluded that the level of market efficiency with respect to a particular fact depends on which of several market mechanisms — universally informed trading, professionally informed trading, derivatively informed trading, and uninformed trading (each of which we explain below) — operates to reflect that fact in market price. Which mechanism is operative, in turn, depends on how widely the fact is distributed among traders, which, I turn, depends on the …
Corporate Takeovers: Who Wins; Who Loses; Who Should Regulate, John C. Coffee Jr., Joseph A. Grundfest, Roberta Romano, Murray L. Weidenbaum
Corporate Takeovers: Who Wins; Who Loses; Who Should Regulate, John C. Coffee Jr., Joseph A. Grundfest, Roberta Romano, Murray L. Weidenbaum
Faculty Scholarship
On December 3, 1987, during its 11th Annual Policy Conference in Washington, DC, the American Enterprise Institute convened a panel discussion on "Corporate Takeovers and Insider Trading: Who Should Regulate?" The panelists were John C. Coffee, Jr., professor of law at Columbia University; Joseph A. Grundfest, commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission; Roberta Romano, professor of law at Yale Law School; and Murray L. Weidenbaum, Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University. The panel was moderated by Christopher C. DeMuth, president of AEI. The following discussion is drawn …