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Full-Text Articles in Law
Due Process In Antitrust Enforcement: Normative And Comparative Perspectives, Christopher S. Yoo, Yong Huang, Thomas Fetzer, Shan Jiang
Due Process In Antitrust Enforcement: Normative And Comparative Perspectives, Christopher S. Yoo, Yong Huang, Thomas Fetzer, Shan Jiang
All Faculty Scholarship
Due process in antitrust enforcement has significant implications for better professional and accurate enforcement decisions. Not only can due process spur economic growth, raise government credibility, and limit the abuse of powers according to law, it also promotes competitive reforms in monopolized sectors and curbs corruption. Jurisdictions learn from the best practices in the investigation process, decisionmaking process, and the announcement and judicial review of antitrust enforcement decisions. By comparing the enforcement policies of China, the European Union, and the United States, this article calls for better disclosure of evidence, participation of legal counsel, and protection of the procedural and …
Due Process In International Antitrust Enforcement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, Christopher S. Yoo
Due Process In International Antitrust Enforcement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
The past year has witnessed an upsurge of international interest in due process in antitrust enforcement, reflected in two new comparative studies and International Competition Network’s (ICN’s) May 2019 adoption of its Recommended Practices for Investigative Process and Framework for Competition Agency Procedures and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Competition Committee’s discussion of the Draft Recommendation on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement in June 2019. This article reviews those developments, traces key differences among them, and looks ahead to what comes next.
Scrutinizing Anticompetitive State Regulations Through Constitutional And Antitrust Lenses, Daniel A. Crane
Scrutinizing Anticompetitive State Regulations Through Constitutional And Antitrust Lenses, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
State and local regulations that anticompetitively favor certain producers to the detriment of consumers are a pervasive problem in our economy. Their existence is explicable by a variety of structural features—including asymmetry between consumer and producer interests, cost externalization, and institutional and political factors entrenching incumbent technologies. Formulating legal tools to combat such economic parochialism is challenging in the post-Lochner world, where any move toward heightened judicial review of economic regulation poses the perceived threat of a return to economic substantive due process. This Article considers and compares two potential tools for reviewing such regulations—a constitutional principle against anticompetitive parochialism …
Harmful, Harmless, And Beneficial Uncertainty In Law, Scott Baker, Alex Raskolnikov
Harmful, Harmless, And Beneficial Uncertainty In Law, Scott Baker, Alex Raskolnikov
Faculty Scholarship
This article examines the impact of four types of law-related uncertainty on the utility of risk-neutral agents. We find that greater legal or factual uncertainty makes agents worse off if enforcement is targeted (meaning that greater deviations from what the law demands lead to a greater probability of enforcement), or if sanctions are graduated (meaning that greater deviations from what the law demands result in higher sanctions). In contrast, agents are indifferent to changes in detection uncertainty induced by variation in enforcement resources or to changes in sanction uncertainty arising from legally irrelevant factors. Finally, risk-neutral agents benefit from greater …
Political Bargaining And Judicial Intervention In Constitutional And Antitrust Federalism, Jim Rossi
Political Bargaining And Judicial Intervention In Constitutional And Antitrust Federalism, Jim Rossi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Federal judicial deference to state and local regulation is at the center of contentious debates regarding the implementation of competition policy. This Article invokes a political process bargaining framework to develop a principled approach for addressing the appropriate level of judicial intervention under the dormant commerce clause and state action immunity from antitrust enforcement. Using illustrations from network industries, it is argued that, at core, these two independent doctrines share a common concern with political (not only market) failure by focusing on the incentives faced by powerful stakeholders in state and local lawmaking. More important, they share the common purpose …
Moving Public Law Out Of The Deference Trap In Regulated Industries, Jim Rossi
Moving Public Law Out Of The Deference Trap In Regulated Industries, Jim Rossi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article argues that public law has fallen into what I call a deference trap in addressing conflicts in deregulated industries, such as telecommunications and electric power. The deference trap describes a judicial reluctance to intervene in disputes involving political institutions, such as regulatory agencies and states. By reassessing the deference trap across the legal doctrines that are effecting emerging telecommunications and electric power markets, public law can deliver much more for deregulated markets. The deference trap poses a particular cost as markets are deregulated, one that may not have been present during previous regulatory eras in which public and …
Judicial Review Of Member-State Regulation Of Trade Within A Federal Or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism And Balancing, Da Capo, Donald H. Regan
Judicial Review Of Member-State Regulation Of Trade Within A Federal Or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism And Balancing, Da Capo, Donald H. Regan
Articles
The topic of this Essay is not one Terry Sandalow has worked on, but he got me started on it by organizing, with Eric Stein, the Bellagio Conference on comparative constitutional economic integration in the United States and the European Community. For that, and for thirty-three years during which he has been an unfailingly stimulating and supportive colleague, Dean, and friend, I am deeply grateful.