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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Partially Prudential Doctrine Of Mootness, Matthew I. Hall
The Partially Prudential Doctrine Of Mootness, Matthew I. Hall
Scholarly Works
The conventional understanding of mootness doctrine is that it operates as a mandatory bar to federal court jurisdiction, derived from the "cases or controversies" clause of the United States Constitution, Article III. In two crucial respects, however, this Constitutional model - which was first adopted by the Supreme Court less than 45 years ago - fails to account for the manner in which courts actually address contentions of mootness. First, the commonly-applied exceptions to the mootness bar are not derived from the "cases or controversies" clause and cannot be reconciled with the Constitutional account of mootness. Second, courts regularly consider …
The Recognition And Enforcement Of Foreign Equitable Remedies And Other Types Of Non-Money Judgments In United States And French Courts: A Comparative Analysis, Noele Sophie Rigot
The Recognition And Enforcement Of Foreign Equitable Remedies And Other Types Of Non-Money Judgments In United States And French Courts: A Comparative Analysis, Noele Sophie Rigot
LLM Theses and Essays
Courts of industrialized nations are often faced with adjudication of cases which involve foreign components. It is common for those courts to be asked by individuals or legal entities from a transnational environment to adjudicate with regard to some elements already adjudged in a different legal system as if it were a local judgment. The question that arises is how effects should be given when dealing with prior adjudications. Most countries agree to recognize some effects determined by foreign jurisdictions, as long as those determinations meet standards that guarantee proper integration of the foreign decision into the domestic setting. These …
Why Professor Redish Is Wrong About Abstention, Michael Wells
Why Professor Redish Is Wrong About Abstention, Michael Wells
Scholarly Works
Most critics of the Supreme Court's abstention doctrines have attacked the substantive merits of rules that channel constitutional litigation away from federal courts and into state courts instead. In a recent article, Martin Redish raises an interesting objection to abstention from a different perspective. He addresses the institutional legitimacy of the rules and contends that whatever their merits, rules like these should be made only by Congress and not the Supreme Court, for they contravene Congress' intent to grant federal courts jurisdiction over constitutional claims against state actors. Part I of this article describes the context in which the choice …