Law Commons^™

Judicial Federalization Doctrine, Gerald S. Dickinson

Articles

This Article explores the concept of “judicial federalization doctrine.” The doctrine emanates from well-documented areas of federal constitutional law, including exactions, racially motivated peremptory challenges, the exclusionary rule, same-sex sodomy, marriage, and freedom of speech and press. The origin and development of these federal doctrines, however, is anything but federal. The U.S. Supreme Court has, on rare occasions, heavily consulted with or borrowed from state court doctrines to create a new federal jurisprudence. While the literature addressing the Court’s occasional vertical dependence on state court doctrine is sparse, there is a complete absence of scholarly attention studying the Court’s reluctance …

A Theory Of Federalization Doctrine, Gerald S. Dickinson

Articles

The doctrine of federalization—the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court consulting state laws or adopting state court doctrines to guide and inform federal constitutional law—is an underappreciated field of study within American constitutional law. Compared to the vast collection of scholarly literature and judicial rulings addressing the outsized influence Supreme Court doctrine and federal constitutional law exert over state court doctrines and state legislative enactments, the opposite phenomenon of the states shaping Supreme Court doctrine and federal constitutional law has been under-addressed. This lack of attention to such a singular feature of American federalism is striking and has resulted in …

Escaping Circularity: The Fourth Amendment And Property Law, João Marinotti

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The Supreme Court’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test under the Fourth Amendment has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable. The Court is presumed to base its decisions on society’s expectations of privacy, while society’s expectations of privacy are themselves presumed to be based on the Court’s judgements. As a solution to this problem, property law has been repeatedly propounded as an allegedly independent, autonomous area of law from which the Supreme Court can glean reasonable expectations of privacy without falling back into tautological reasoning.

Such an approach presupposes that property law is not itself circular. If …

Exacting Inclusion: Property Theory, The Character Of Government Action, And Implicit Takings, Donald J. Smythe

Faculty Scholarship

Recent takings cases challenging inclusionary housing ordinances tap into an ongoing controversy about whether government interventions in the housing market do more harm than good; but they also raise much more general questions about takings law. This Article uses the controversy raised by recent housing cases to probe the relationship between the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence and its exaction takings jurisprudence and to suggest a more coherent approach to implicit takings. The Court’s exaction takings jurisprudence is well-designed if it is applied appropriately. As a general matter, it encourages the mitigation of socially harmful nuisances, incentivizes developers to make …

Murr V. Wisconsin And The Inherent Limits Of Regulatory Takings, Lynda L. Butler

Faculty Publications

This article examines the confusion surrounding constitutional protection of property under the substantive due process and takings clauses, using Murr as a springboard for reconsidering the substantive due process/takings distinction and asking whether the regulatory takings doctrine should remain a viable constitutional concept despite its muddled principles. While powerful reasons support treating as compensable economic regulations that are functionally equivalent to physical takings, important differences between physical and regulatory takings need to be recognized as limits to the degree of equivalence possible and therefore to the regulatory takings doctrine. A look back at the evolutionary paths of substantive due process, …

The Resilience Of Property, Lynda L. Butler

Faculty Publications

Resilience is essential to the ability of property to face transforming social and environmental change. For centuries, property has responded to such change through a dialectical process that identifies emerging disciplinary perspectives and debates conflicting values and norms. This dialectic promotes the resilience of property, allowing it to adapt to changing conditions and needs. Today the mainstream economic theory dominating common law property is progressively being intertwined with constitutionally protected property, undermining its long-term resilience. The coupling of the economic vision of ordinary property with constitutional property embeds the assumptions, choices, and values of the economic theory into both realms …

Property's Constitution, James Y. Stern

Faculty Publications

Long-standing disagreements over the definition of property as a matter of legal theory present a special problem in constitutional law. The Due Process and Takings Clauses establish individual rights that can be asserted only if “property” is at stake. Yet the leading cases interpreting constitutional property doctrines have never managed to articulate a coherent general view of property, and in some instances have reached opposite conclusions about its meaning. Most notably, government benefits provided in the form of individual legal entitlements are considered “property” for purposes of due process but not takings doctrines, a conflict the cases acknowledge but do …

If They Can Raze It, Why Can't I? A Constitutional Analysis Of Statutory And Judicial Religious Exemptions To Historic Preservation Ordinances, Erin Guiffre

Georgetown Law Historic Preservation Papers Series

In 1996, America almost lost a great piece of its history. The Cathedral of Saint Vibiana, located in Los Angeles, was in danger of being destroyed. The "Baroque-inspired Italianate structure" was completed in 1876 by architect Ezra F. Kysor. The cathedral is one of only a few structures from Los Angeles' early history remaining. As an important part of history and a beautiful piece of architecture, the cathedral was listed on California's register of historic places. In 1994, an earthquake damaged part of the building. After an inspection by the building and safety department in 1996, the only portion of …

Legislatively Revising Kelo V. City Of New London: Eminent Domain, Federalism, And Congressional Powers, Bernard W. Bell

Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers

This paper explores Congress’ power to limit state and local authorities’ use of eminent domain to further economic revitalization. More particularly, it examines whether Congress can constrain the discretion to invoke eminent domain which state and local officials appear entitled to under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). The question involves and exploration and assessment of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence regarding federalism and judicial supremacy.

In providing that private property may not be taken for “public use” without just compensation, the Fifth Amendment implicitly precludes government …

Private Property, Development And Freedom, Steven J. Eagle

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

The author asserts that adherence to the rule of law, including property law, is a necessary condition to economic development and human freedom. United States governmental agencies and private institutes have attempted to convey this message to Russia, other states of the former Soviet Union, and former Soviet satellite states, with some success. Finally, and unfortunately, the United States has veered away from the very adherence to the rule of law respecting property which it espouses abroad.

Overcoming Poletown: County Of Wayne V. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, And The Future Of Public Use, Ilya Somin

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

County of Wayne v. Hathcock is an important step forward in public use takings law. The Michigan Supreme Court was right to overturn its notorious 1981 Poletown decision and forbid condemnations that transfer property to private parties solely on the grounds that the new owners will contribute to “economic development.” Poletown was the best known and most widely criticized decision justifying a nearly unlimited condemnation power.

As the Poletown case dramatically demonstrates, the economic development rationale is a virtual blank check for eminent domain abuse for the benefit of private parties. Poletown upheld a condemnation as a result of which …

The Nature Of Representation: The Cherokee Right To A Congressional Delegate, Ezra Rosser

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This paper explores the history and present day implications of the Cherokee Nation's 1835 treaty-based right to a Congressional Delegate.

Property As A Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, Gregory S. Alexander

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

This article examines an apparent paradox in comparative constitutional law. Property rights are not treated as a fundamental right in American constitutional law; they are, however, under the Basic Law (i.e., constitution) of Germany, a social-welfare state that otherwise gives less weight to property. The article uses this apparent paradox as a vehicle for considering the different reasons why constitutions protect property. It explains the difference between the German and American constitutional treatment of property on the basis of the quite different approaches taken in the two systems to the purposes of constitutional protection of property.

Land Use Regulation And The Takings Clause: How Much Use Must An Owner Lose Before Being Entitled To Compensation Because The Government Has Taken The Property?, Patrick C. Mcginley

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Evolving Thresholds Of Nuisance And The Takings Clause, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This article reviews the historical tradition in which the common law core of nuisance has been the frequent subject of statutory additions and refinements, providing most of our modern law of land use and environmental protection. Until Lucas, the Takings Clause had not been treated as a charter establishing the courts as boards of revision to rethink and selectively veto legislative determinations in the land use field. Within the scope of “total takings,” however, Lucas has converted the Takings Clause from its original meaning and made it exactly that.

"Taking" The Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests And Judicial Revision Of Legislative Judgments, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Article examines the diversion of the Takings Clause from its historic limited role to that of a charter for courts to second-guess legislative determinations of land-use rights and wrongs. As we shall see, prior to Lucas the Supreme Court and others following its lead have generally not regarded the Takings Clause as a warrant for reaching de novo determinations on land use problems and then substituting such judicial determinations, if different, for those of the legislature. Some notable exceptions in the Claims Court and Federal Circuit will then be considered along with the ostensible Supreme Court authority, a sentence …

What Is Behind The "Property Rights" Debate?, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council' obviously presents issues that range far more broadly than just whether people should be allowed to build on beaches and dunes. Many observers have viewed the case as a splendid opportunity for the Supreme Court to re-establish private owner autonomy in land use decisions - to cut down, perhaps drastically, on elected legislatures' traditional power to protect the environment by regulating uses of land. Behind the "property rights" debate is the question of whether states and communities really ought to have the power that they have traditionally had to control the development and patterns …

Constitutional Limits On The Power To Take Private Property: Public Purpose And Public Use, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The rights/freedoms dichotomy tacitly permeates Supreme Court ‘takings' jurisprudence, and it has an explanatory power which extends to virtually all ‘takings' cases decided by the Court. Its explanatory power does not, however, extend to the relatively few cases which involve the taking of ‘rights' for purely private use, that is rearrangements of existing private property rights, as opposed to takings for use by the government or its designees in some public service function. Because rearranging the existing pattern of private ownership takes ‘rights' and not mere ‘freedoms,’ we might expect, according to the rights/freedoms pattern, that the Court would uniformly …

Economic Due Process And The Takings Clause, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The discussion which follows will examine the new verbalizations repeatedly employed in Supreme Court takings decisions of the past decade and the Court's enlistment of the just compensation requirement as a basis for undertaking substantive review of legislation. As an introduction, the distinctive historical roles and roots of the substantive due process and just compensation requirements will be reviewed.

Nollan V. California Coastal Commission, Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Supreme Court Case Files

No abstract provided.

Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances Of 1910-1913, Garrett Power

Faculty Scholarship

On May 15, 1911, Baltimore Mayor J. Barry Mahool signed into law an ordinance for “preserving the peace, preventing conflict and ill feeling between the white and colored races in Baltimore City.” This ordinance provided for the use of separate blocks by African American and whites and was the first such law in the nation directly aimed at segregating black and white homeowners. This article considers the historical significance of Baltimore’s first housing segregation law.

A Unifying Theory For The Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation And Public Use, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This discussion begins with some remarks concerning the concept of property as a general matter. It will then consider briefly an approach to the problem which, though promising and advanced, nevertheless falls short of achieving an internally consistent, unifying theory. Following this introduction, an attempt will be made to specify the two distinctive conceptual components of property interests on whose difference the cases seem to turn, and then to demonstrate the suitability of this conceptual distinction as the foundation for a coherent theory of the law.

United States V. 564.64 Arces Of Land, More Or Less, Situated In Monroe And Pike Counties, Pennsylvania, Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Supreme Court Case Files

No abstract provided.

Review Of Private Property And The Constitution By Bruce Ackerman, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.