Law Commons^™

Jazz Improvisation And The Law: Constrained Choice, Sequence, And Strategic Movement Within Rules, William W. Buzbee

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article argues that a richer understanding of the nature of law is possible through comparative, analogical examination of legal work and the art of jazz improvisation. This exploration illuminates a middle ground between rule of law aspirations emphasizing stability and determinate meanings and contrasting claims that the untenable alternative is pervasive discretionary or politicized law. In both the law and jazz improvisation settings, the work involves constraining rules, others’ unpredictable actions, and strategic choosing with attention to where a collective creation is going. One expects change and creativity in improvisation, but the many analogous characteristics of law illuminate why …

The Lost Promise Of Progressive Formalism, Andrea Scoseria Katz

Scholarship@WashULaw

Today, any number of troubling government pathologies—a lawless presidency, a bloated and unaccountable administrative state, the growth of an activist bench—are associated with the emergence of a judicial philosophy that disregards the “plain meaning” of the Constitution for a loose, unprincipled “living constitutionalism.” Many trace its origins to the Progressive Era
(1890–1920), a time when Americans turned en masse to government as the solution to emerging problems of economic modernity—financial panics, industrial concentration, worsening workplace conditions, and skyrocketing unemployment and inequality—and, the argument goes, concocted a flexible, new constitutional philosophy to allow the federal government to take on vast, new …

The Constitutional Nature Of The United States Tax Court, Brant J. Hellwig

Scholarly Articles

Is the United States Tax Court part of the Executive Branch of government? One would expect that question would be capable of being definitively answered without considerable difficulty. And as recently expressed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that indeed is the case. In the course of addressing a challenge to the President's ability to remove a judge of the Tax Court for cause on separation of powers grounds, the D.C. Circuit rejected the premise that the removal power implicates two branches of government: "the Tax Court exercises Executive authority as part of the Executive …

Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …

The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash

Faculty Publications

Modern Justice Department opinions insist that the executive branch must enforce and defend laws. In the first article to systematically examine Department of Justice refusals to defend, we make four points. First, the duties to enforce and defend lack any sound basis in the Constitution. Hence, while President Obama is right to refuse to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, he is wrong to continue to enforce a law he believes is unconstitutional. Second, rather than being grounded in the Constitution, the duties are better explained by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) desire to enhance its independence and status. By …

On The Contemporary Meaning Of Korematsu: 'Liberty Lies In The Hearts Of Men And Women', David A. Harris

Articles

In just a few years, seven decades will have passed since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Korematsu v. U.S., one of the most reviled of all of the Court’s cases. Despised or not, however, similarities between the World War II era and our own have people looking at Korematsu in a new light. When the Court decided Korematsu in 1944, we were at war with the Japanese empire, and with this came considerable suspicion of anyone who shared the ethnicity of our foreign enemies. Since 2001, we have faced another external threat – from the al Queda terrorists – …

Conflicts Between The Commander In Chief And Congress: Concurrent Power Over The Conduct Of War, Jules Lobel

Articles

The Bush Administration argues that the Commander in Chief has exclusive power to decide what military tactics to use to defeat a wartime enemy. The Administration's constitutional position that Congress may not permissibly interfere with these Executive Commander in Chief powers has been heavily criticized, particularly with respect to the Executive power to interrogate prisoners or engage in warrantless wiretapping on American citizens and its argument that Congress cannot limit the Iraq war. Yet, many critics concur in the Administration's starting point - that the President has exclusive authority over battlefield operations.

This article challenges that assumption. It argues that …

Executive Aggrandizement In Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, Michael P. Van Alstine

Faculty Scholarship

This article analyzes the power of the President to create federal law on the foundation of the executive’s status as the constitutional representative of the United States in foreign affairs. Executive branch advocates have claimed such a power throughout constitutional history. Recent events also have revived this constitutional controversy with particular vigor. In specific, President Bush recently issued a surprise “Determination” which asserted that the implied executive powers of Article II of the Constitution permit the President to enforce in domestic law the obligations owed to foreign states under international law.

The article first sets the legal and factual context …

The Unitary Executive During The Third Half-Century, 1889-1945, Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, Laurence D. Nee

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress's authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President's control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the executive by committee employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a unitary executive, in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features …

The Unitary Executive During The Second Half-Century, Steven G. Calabresi, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent Supreme Court decisions and political events have reinvigorated the debate over Congress's authority to restrict the President's control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitutional Convention rejected the executive by committee employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a unitary executive in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has turned towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in favor of the unitary executive. …

The Legalization Of The Presidencey: A Twenty-Five Year Watergate Retrospective, Michael A. Fitts

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Unitary Executive During The First Half-Century, Steven G. Calabresi, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress’s authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President’s control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the “executive by committee” employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a “unitary executive,” in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features …

Ronald V. Dellums V. George Bush (D.D.C. 1990): Memorandum Amicus Curiae Of Law Professors, Bruce A. Ackerman, Abram Chayes, Lori Fisler Damrosch, John Hart Ely, Erwin N. Griswold, Gerald Gunther, Louis Henkin, Harold Hongju Koh, Philip B. Kurland, Laurence H. Tribe, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Publications

This joint memorandum is submitted to the court hearing Dellums v. Bush. This amicus brief advocates that the President may not order American armed forces to make war without consultation with and approval by Congress. The brief also argues that the case is justiciable.

Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Congress, The President, And The Power To Declare War: A Requiem For Vietnam, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Publications

Several arguments have been advanced in support of the President's authority to continue use of the Armed Forces in Vietnam without a congressional declaration of war as provided by the Constitution. Congressional ratification of the Southeast Asia Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as enactment of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, are often urged as constituting sufficient congressional authorization for the President's actions. Some have gone further and contended that congressional authorization was not a prerequisite in the Vietnam conflict because the President never exceeded his historically recognized authority to act unilaterally in defense of the …

The Appointing And Removal Powers Of The President Under The Constitution Of The United States, Guy Despard Goff

James Goold Cutler Lecture

No abstract provided.