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Brief Of Political Scientists And Historians As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondent, National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner V. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, United States Supreme Court (Nov. 25, 2013), David F. Forte, Hadley P. Arkes, Joseph M. Bessette, Nelson Lund, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Ralph A. Rossum

Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

The Recess Appointments Clause does not permit the unilateral appointments to the NLRB made by the President in this case. Those appointments - made during a three-day “intra-session” break when the Senate was meeting pro forma - are unique in the history of the Republic. They are also the culmination of unnecessary and inappropriate Executive overreaching. This overreaching has undermined a valuable Senate prerogative in a manner unfathomable to the Founders and inconsistent with the design of the Constitution.

The primary purpose of this brief is to show that adhering to the original meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause has …

The Commerce Clause And Executive Power: Exploring Nascent Individual Rights In National Federal Of Independent Business V. Sebelius (2012), Ronald Kahn

Schmooze 'tickets'

No abstract provided.

Congress Underestimated: The Case Of The World Bank, Kristina Daugirdas

Articles

This article challenges the oft-repeated claim that international organizations undermine democracy by marginalizing national legislatures. Over the past forty years, Congress has established itself as a key player in setting U.S. policy toward the World Bank. Congress has done far more than restrain executive branch action with which it disagrees; it has affirmatively shaped the United States’ day-to-day participation in this key international organization and successfully defended its constitutional authority to do so.

The President's Enforcement Power, Kate Andrias

Articles

Enforcement of law is at the core of the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care” that the laws are faithfully executed, and it is a primary mechanism for effecting national regulatory policy. Yet questions about how presidents oversee agency enforcement activity have received surprisingly little scholarly attention. This Article provides a positive account of the President’s role in administrative enforcement, explores why presidential enforcement has taken the shape it has, and examines the bounds of the President’s enforcement power. It demonstrates that presidential involvement in agency enforcement, though extensive, has been ad hoc, crisis-driven, and frequently opaque. The Article thus …