Law Commons^™

Due Process As Separation Of Powers, Nathan S. Chapman, Michael W. Mcconnell

Scholarly Works

From its conceptual origin in Magna Charta, due process of law has required that government can deprive persons of rights only pursuant to a coordinated effort of separate institutions that make, execute, and adjudicate claims under the law. Originalist debates about whether the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments were understood to entail modern “substantive due process” have obscured the way that many American lawyers and courts understood due process to limit the legislature from the Revolutionary era through the Civil War. They understood due process to prohibit legislatures from directly depriving persons of rights, especially vested property rights, because it was …

Subtraction By Addition?: The Thirteenth And Fourteenth Amendments, Mark A. Graber

Faculty Scholarship

The celebration of the Thirteenth Amendment in many Essays prepared for this Symposium may be premature. That the Thirteenth Amendment arguably protects a different and, perhaps, wider array of rights than the Fourteenth Amendment may be less important than the less controversial claim that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified after the Thirteenth Amendment. If the Fourteenth Amendment covers similar ground as the Thirteenth Amendment, but protects a narrower set of rights than the Thirteenth Amendment, then the proper inference may be that the Fourteenth Amendment repealed or modified crucial rights originally protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. The broad interpretation of …

Federalism, Individual Rights And Judicial Engagement, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

Contemporary “rights talk” under the American Constitution tends to focus on individual rights or those rights that can be perfected in the case of a single individual. This would include, for example, the rights to free expression, free exercise of religion, sexual autonomy, or the right to equal treatment. Under the broad umbrella of individual-rights talk, theoretical discussions generally involve whether courts ought to recognize a particular individual right or what level of scrutiny (or engagement) ought to apply to judicially identified individual rights.

From the beginning of our history as a nation, however, the concept of legally cognizable rights …