Law Commons^™

Command And Control: Operationalizing The Unitary Executive, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The concept of the unitary executive is written into the Constitution by virtue of Article II’s vesting of the “executive Power” in the President and not in executive officers created by Congress. Defenders and opponents alike of the “unitary executive” often equate the idea of presidential control of executive action with the power to remove executive personnel. But an unlimitable presidential removal power cannot be derived from the vesting of executive power in the President for the simple reason that it would not actually result in full presidential control of executive action, as the actions of now-fired subordinates would still …

Congressional Meddling In Presidential Elections: Still Unconstitutional After All These Years; A Comment On Sunstein, Gary S. Lawson, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In a prior article, see Jack Beermann & Gary Lawson, The Electoral Count Mess: The Electoral Count Act of 1887 Is Unconstitutional, and Other Fun Facts (Plus a Few Random Academic Speculations) about Counting Electoral Votes, 16 FIU L. REV. 297 (2022), we argued that much of the 1877 Electoral Count Act unconstitutionally gave Congress a role in counting and certifying electoral votes. In 2022, Congress amended the statute to make it marginally more constitutional in some respects and significantly less constitutional in others. In response to a forthcoming article by Cass Sunstein defending the new Electoral Count …

Congressional Administration Of Foreign Affairs, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate. Wherever the formal line between Congress and the President’s powers is drawn, it is well established that as a functional matter, even in times of great discord between the two branches, the President wields immense power when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.

And yet, while scholarship focuses on the accretion of power in the presidency, presidential primacy is not the end of the story. The fact that the President usually “wins” in foreign affairs does not …

"I'M Leavin' It (All) Up To You": Gundy And The (Sort-Of) Resurrection Of The Subdelegation Doctrine, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In 2000, Cass Sunstein quipped that the conventional nondelegation doctrine, which holds that there are judicially enforceable constitutional limits on the extent to which Congress can confer discretion on other actors to determine the content of federal law, “has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”1 The “one good year,” he said, was 1935, when the Court twice held unconstitutional certain provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act that gave the president power to approve or create codes of conduct for essentially all American businesses, subject only to very vague, and often contradictory, statutory exhortations to pursue …

Barack Obama's Emancipation Proclamation: An Essay In Memory Of Judge Richard D. Cudahy, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In a case involving whether illegal immigrants were protected under federal labor law, Judge Richard Cudahy, observed that illegal immigrants are often at the mercy of unscrupulous employers and that immigrations laws provide employers “with a powerful tool for unfair and oppressive treatment of migrant labor.” There are millions of people in the United States who are vulnerable to exploitation in the workplace due to their illegal immigration status. In 2012 and 2014, the Obama administration announced programs designed to provide limited security to some of the millions of illegal immigrants present in the United States. These programs are, in …

Obama's Conversion On Same-Sex Marriage: The Social Foundations Of Individual Rights, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This essay explores how presidents who wish to seize a leadership role over the development of rights must tend to the social foundations of those rights. Broad cultural changes alone do not guarantee success, nor do they dictate the substance of constitutional ideas. Rather, presidential aides must actively re-characterize the social conditions in which rights are made, disseminated, and enforced. An administration must articulate a strategically plausible theory of a particular right, ensure there is cultural and institutional support for that right, and work to minimize blowback. Executive branch officials must seek to transform and popularize legal concepts while working …

The Surprising Origins Of The Interstate Commerce Commission, Jack M. Beermann

Shorter Faculty Works

Many law review articles fail to live up to the promise of their titles or abstracts, leaving disappointed readers in their wake. Others have titles that hide the ball. Behind the wordy and somewhat bland title of Jed Shugerman’s 2015 article—The Dependent Origins of Independent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Tenure of Office Act, and the Rise of Modern Campaign Finance—lies a fascinating new take on the origins of independent agencies.

The identification of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) as the first modern independent regulatory agency is familiar to scholars of American administrative law. The ICC, created …

“Government By Injunction,” Legal Elites, And The Making Of The Modern Federal Courts, Kristin Collins

Faculty Scholarship

The tendency of legal discourse to obscure the processes by which social and political forces shape the law’s development is well known, but the field of federal courts in American constitutional law may provide a particularly clear example of this phenomenon. According to conventional accounts, Congress’s authority to regulate the lower federal courts’ “jurisdiction”—generally understood to include their power to issue injunctions— has been a durable feature of American constitutional law since the founding. By contrast, the story I tell in this essay is one of change. During the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, many jurists considered the federal …

The Proposed Separation Of Powers Restoration Act Goes Too Far, Jack M. Beermann

Shorter Faculty Works

If passed, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act would require federal courts conducting judicial review of agency action to decide “de novo all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions and rules.” Although I have long been highly critical of Chevron, see, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 9 (2010), and also have misgivings about Auer deference, I fear that the proposed Act goes too far in completely eliminating deference to agency legal determinations.

The Civil Rights Act Of 1964 And 'Legislating Morality': On Conscience, Prejudice, And Whether 'Stateways' Can Change 'Folkways', Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

Influential studies, from the 1940s and 1950s, of the problem of prejudice and how to remedy it challenged the famous assertion of nineteenth-century sociologist William Graham Sumner that “stateways don’t change folkways,” and its modern counterparts, “you cannot legislate against prejudice” or “you cannot legislate morality.” Social scientists countered that, although people might initially protest, they would welcome a federal antidiscrimination law that aligned with conscience and closed the gap between American ideals and prejudice, creating new “folkways.” Using examples from the contexts of public accommodations, education, and employment, this Article examines similar arguments made about conscience and “legislating morality” …

Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, And The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, Paul Gugliuzza

Faculty Scholarship

Barely three years after passing the America Invents Act, Congress is again considering patent reform legislation. At least fourteen patent reform bills were introduced in the recently concluded 113th Congress. Several of those bills focused specifically on patent litigation, proposing, among other things, to impose heightened pleading requirements on plaintiffs, to limit discovery, and to create a presumption that the losing party should pay the winner’s attorneys’ fees. None of the proposals became law, but one of the bills (the Innovation Act) passed the House of Representatives. In addition, scholars continue to call for reform, and Republican members of Congress …

Congress's (Less) Limited Power To Represent Itself In Court: A Comment On Grove And Devins, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In their recent article, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014) Tara Leigh Grove and Neal Devins make the case against congressional litigation in defense of the constitutionality of federal statutes. They conclude that Congress, or a single House of Congress, may not defend the constitutionality of federal statutes in court even when the Executive Branch has decided not to do so but may litigate only in furtherance of Congress’s investigatory and disciplinary powers. Grove and Devins claim that congressional litigation in support of the constitutionality of federal statutes violates two separate but …

Professed Values, Constructive Interpretation, And Political History: Comments On Sotirios Barber, The Fallacies Of States' Rights, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Our barely functioning Congress seems to embody the issues that this conference on constitutional dysfunction is meant to address. At this moment, however, congressional disarray may result less from institutional design than from our lasting heritage of white supremacy. Republican control of the House owes much to the party's Southern Strategy, which has exploited widespread dissatisfaction with the Democrats' official renunciation of racial stratification. That challenge to the American Way is exacerbated by the idea, outrageous to some, of a black President. That context has some bearing on this Symposium's topic of federalism. For, as Professor Larry Yackle reminds us, …

The Creation Of The Department Of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights Or Civil Service, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

This Article offers a new interpretation of the founding of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1870 as an effort to shrink and professionalize the federal government. The traditional view is that Congress created the DOJ to increase the federal government's capacity to litigate a growing docket due to the Civil War. More recent scholarship contends that Congress created the DOJ to enforce Reconstruction and ex-slaves' civil rights. However, it has been overlooked that the DOJ Act eliminated about one-third of federal legal staff. The founding of the DOJ had less to do with Reconstruction, and more to do with …

'Petitions Without Number': Widows' Petitions And The Early Nineteenth-Century Origins Of Public Marriage-Based Entitlements, Kristin Collins

Faculty Scholarship

Between 1792 and 1858, Congress enacted approximately seventy-six public law statutes granting cash subsidies to large classes of military widows. War widows’ pensions were not wholly unknown in Anglo-American law before this time, but the widows’ pension system of the early nineteenth century was distinctive in both scope and kind: Congress rejected the class-based approach that had characterized war widows’ pensions of the eighteenth century by pensioning widows of rank-and-file soldiers, not just widows of officers, and by extending pensions to widows of veterans. This significant equalization and expansion of widows’ pensions resulted in the creation of the first broad-scale …

Toward A More Democratic Congress?, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

There is considerable talk of failure in the air these days - including constitutional failure, moral failure, political failure and institutional failure - and criticisms of Congress figure prominently in this discourse. First, I shall ask whether talk about Congress being "the broken branch," the topic of the first panel in this symposium, is talk of constitutional failure or failure of some other sort. Second, to link the topic of that panel to the topic of the panel in which I participated, I will ask whether some call Congress the broken branch because it is not adequately or appropriately democratic. …

The Constitution's Congress, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In order to know whether Congress is (as the title of this panel wonders)1 "the broken branch,"'2 one needs a baseline describing how a normallyfunctioning Congress would look.3 Congress is a creation of the Constitution, and so the Constitution seems to be the obvious place to look for this baseline: what sort of people does the Constitution expect to serve in Congress and how does it expect those people to behave once they arrive?

The Turn Toward Congress In Administrative Law, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Congress engages in an extensive and ever-increasing level of oversight of the activities of the Executive Branch. The level of observation and supervision is high enough that it is appropriate to hold Congress responsible for a very high proportion of the activities of the Executive Branch. In recent years, so much attention has been paid to assertions of power by the President and the Supreme Court, Congress has been somewhat neglected. This paper analyzes the power of Congress mainly through an administrative law lens with the aim of pointing out ways in which Congress has remained or become responsible for …

Ordinary Powers In Extraordinary Times: Common Sense In Times Of Crisis Symposium: Extraordinary Powers In Ordinary Times, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution was written, debated, ratified, and implemented in the shadow of crisis. The country was birthed in war. In the aftermath of ratification, opponents of the Constitution could have precipitated a civil war that would have jeopardized the survival of the fledgling national government. I Throughout the founding era, any number of European powers were perceived to pose a serious threat of invasion. 2 Well into the 1800s, especially in certain northeastern states, substantial homegrown support for realignment with England persisted; the possibility of an internal rebellion in those areas was quite real.3 Individuals interested more in power …

Congressional Administration, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, at least since President Reagan's precedent-setting Executive Order 12291, the phenomenon of direct presidential supervision of agencies has received significant attention in legal scholarship. Congress's involvement has been much less thoroughly examined, and, although most people are familiar with congressional hearings and oversight, the dominant image as a legal matter is that once Congress legislates, it loses control over how its laws are administered unless it chooses to legislate again. In the political science/public policy literature, the understanding of Congress's role in monitoring agencies has evolved from despair that Congress is not sufficiently engaged to a recognition …

Congress, Controlled Substances, And Physician-Assisted Suicide: Elephants In Mouseholes, George J. Annas

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Oregon to reject the U.S. attorney general's authority to prohibit physicians in Oregon from prescribing Schedule II drugs for their terminally ill patients to commit suicide can seem paradoxical and confusing. How is it that California cannot permit the patients of physicians who recommend marijuana, a Schedule I drug, to possess legally and use marijuana that they may need to survive, but Oregon can legally permit physicians to prescribe Schedule II drugs and patients to possess and use such drugs to end their lives?

Lochner: Another Time, Another Place Symposium: Lochner Centennial Conference, Larry Yackle

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Lynn Baker's contribution to this symposium' extends her longterm project both to defend and to critique the Supreme Court's decisions on the scope of congressional power.2 I find this work valuable and not a little provocative. If Baker's account of the decisions thus far is even partly right, the Court is poised to assume decision-making responsibility that has long been ceded to Congress. If her proposals for the future are adopted, we are in for a cataclysmic constitutional event that rivals the convulsive period when the nation confronted the judicial arrogation of authority associated (rightly or wrongly) with the …

Jumping Frogs, Endangered Toads, And California's Medical-Marijuana Law, George J. Annas

Faculty Scholarship

Mark Twain wasn't thinking about federalism or the structure of American government when he wrote “The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County.” Nonetheless, he would be amused to know that today, almost 150 years later, the Calaveras County Fair and Jumping Frog Jubilee not only has a jumping-frog contest but also has its own Frog Welfare Policy. The policy includes a provision for the “Care of Sick or Injured Frogs” and a limitation entitled “Frogs Not Permitted to Participate,” which stipulates that “under no circumstances will a frog listed on the endangered species list be permitted to participate in the …

Making A Federal Case Of It: Sabri V. United States And The Constitution Of Leviathan, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The popular expression “Don't make a federal case out of it!” only makes sense if federal involvement is something unusual or special that is reserved for matters of urgent national interest. It assumes that a “federal case” is, or at least ought to be, something relatively rare and noteworthy.

For the founding generation, federal involvement in people's affairs, especially through the criminal law, was in fact a relatively rare and noteworthy event. In The Federalist, James Madison told the citizens of New York that the powers of the proposed new national government “will be exercised principally on external objects, as …

A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus And Deference On The Supreme Court, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has struck down federal statutes by a bare majority with unprecedented frequency. This Article shows that five-four decisions regularly overturning acts of Congress are a relatively recent phenomenon, whereas earlier Courts generally exercised judicial review by supermajority voting.

One option is to establish the following rule: The Supreme Court may not declare an act of Congress unconstitutional without a two-thirds majority. The Supreme Court itself could establish this rule internally, just as it has created its nonmajority rules for granting certiorari and holds, or one Justice who would otherwise be the fifth …

Congress And The Legislative Web Of Trust, Alan L. Feld

Faculty Scholarship

Trust in the legislative arena does not flow from altruism. It rests on two related foundations: personal interactions and rational incentives. Legislators must engage with each other over at least a two-year term and usually far longer. Their encounters reflect the dynamic of continuing players rather than one-time participants. Thus, failure to carry out commitments chills the possibility of future advantageous agreements with the aggrieved party. Moreover, the process of shared experience and personal interaction can create friendships that make the foundation for trust personal as well as professional. Further, each House of Congress has many of the characteristics of …

Outcome, Procedure, And Process: Agency Duties Of Explanation For Legal Conclusions, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The so-called Chevron doctrine,' which requires reviewing courts to accept all reasonable agency interpretations of statutes that the agency administers,2 is one of the most important doctrines in modern federal administrative law. Under the now-familiar two-step formulation enunciated by the Chevron court, if Congress "has directly spoken to the precise question at issue ... , that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."3 If the statute is ambiguous, however, the court must accept any permissible, or reasonable,4 interpretation put forth by the agency.5 …

Separation Of Political Powers: Boundaries Or Balance, Alan L. Feld

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most significant structural elements of the United States Constitution divides the political power of the government between two discrete political institutions, the Congress and the President, in order to prevent concentration of the full power of the national government in one place. This governmental structure has posed a continuing dilemma of how to allow for the shared decisionmaking necessary to effective government while maintaining the independence of each political branch. As the United States Congress reaches its two hundredth anniversary, questions concerning the relationship between Congress and the President, for a substantial time thought by legal scholars …

Radiation From Nuclear Power Plants: The Need For Congressional Directives, Michael S. Baram

Faculty Scholarship

Congress often responds to a complex problem by empowering an independent regulatory agency to enforce its legislative will. Acknowledging its own lack of knowledge and time, Congress gives the agency a measure of freedom to modify the legal requirements to fit a variety of circumstances that the legislature could not foresee. Ordinarily Congress restrains this autonomy by prescribing general criteria that the agency must consider and objectives that must be met.' These provisions enable Congress to measure the agency's progress and make necessary changes in the law. In addition, competition from other bureaus forces the agency to act vigorously or …