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What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation In M&A Deals?, Randall Thomas
What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation In M&A Deals?, Randall Thomas
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Many M&A transactions attract shareholder litigation challenging the fairness of the economic terms of the deal for the target shareholders. Since the end of the financial crisis, however, there has been a documented increase in the number of jurisdictions in which each individual transaction is attacked. Why has this upsurge in multi-jurisdictional litigation occurred? How significant are its real costs and benefits? And what should we do about it, if anything? This Article first summarizes what we know about these questions and then offers its own viewpoint on how best to respond to multi-jurisdictional litigation. On the one side, the …
Erie And The Rules Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng
Erie And The Rules Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Jay Tidmarsh offers an intriguing new test for drawing the allimportant line between procedure and substance for purposes of Erie. The Tidmarsh test is attractively simple, yet seemingly reaches the right result in separating out truly “procedural” rules from more substantive ones. Since I am not a proceduralist, in this Response I will leave the Tidmarsh test’s explanatory power and practical workability vis-à-vis general civil procedure rules to others more qualified than I. Instead, I want to focus on the implications of the Tidmarsh test for the Federal Rules of Evidence. Like others in the evidence world, I have long …
Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Class action lawyers are some of the most frequently derided players in our system of civil litigation. It is often asserted that class action lawyers take too much from class judgments as fees, that class actions are little more than a device for the lawyers to enrich themselves at the expense of the class. In this Article, I argue that some of this criticism of class action lawyers is misguided. In particular, I perform a normative examination of fee percentages in class action litigation using the social-welfarist utilitarian account of litigation known as deterrence-insurance theory. I argue that in perhaps …