Law Commons^™

Interest Rates, Venture Capital, And Financial Stability, Hilary J. Allen

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Following several prominent bank failures and as central banks continue to tighten interest rates to fight inflation, there is increasing interest in the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability. This Article illuminates one path through which the prolonged period of low interest rates from 2009-2021 has impacted financial stability: it traces how yield-seeking behavior in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis and Covid pandemic led to a bubble in the venture capital industry, which in turn spawned a crypto bubble as well as a run on the VC-favored Silicon Valley Bank. This Article uses this narrative to illustrate …

Defi: Shadow Banking 2.0?, Hilary J. Allen

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The growth of so-called “shadow banking” was a significant contributor to the financial crisis of 2008, which had huge social costs that we still grapple with today. Our financial regulatory system still hasn’t fully figured out how to address the risks of the derivatives, securitizations, and money market mutual funds that comprised Shadow Banking 1.0, but we’re already facing the prospect o fShadow Banking 2.0in the form of decentralized finance, or “DeFi.” DeFi’s proponents speak of a future where sending money is as easy as sending a photograph–but money is not the same as a photograph. The stakes are much …

"Use And Improve" Is My Accountability Mantra, Despite 30 Years Of Eye-Opening Disappointments, Natalie Bridgeman Fields

Perspectives

This essay finds justification for championing the continued existence, functioning and evolution of Independent Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs). An inside assessment of the thirty-year functioning of IAMs reveals that inadequate power and independence are severely hampering IAM efforts to hold actors accountable for harm. Simultaneously, IAMs can’t make progress without the underlying financial institutions reforming their incentive structures to reward harm prevention and remedy. Despite decades of systemic failure to deliver accountability, when exceptions happen, they are worth it and can be spectacular. With an influx of new climate-related funding expected at the financial institutions, exceptions need to become the rule. …

Bankruptcy For Banks: A Tribute (And Little Plea) To Jay Westbrook, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

In this brief essay, to be included in a book celebrating the work of Jay Westbrook, I begin by surveying Jay’s wide-ranging contributions to bankruptcy scholarship. Jay’s functional analysis has had a profound effect on scholars’ understanding of key issues in domestic bankruptcy law, and Jay has been the leading scholarly figure on cross-border insolvency. After surveying Jay’s influence, I turn to the topic at hand: a proposed reform that would facilitate the use of bankruptcy to resolve the financial distress of large financial institutions. Jay has been a strong critic of this legislation, arguing that financial institutions need to …

How To Help Small Businesses Survive Covid-19, Todd Baker, Kathryn Judge

Faculty Scholarship

Small businesses are among the hardest hit by the COVID-19 crisis. Many are shuttered, and far more face cash flow constraints, raising questions about just how many will survive this recession. The government has responded with a critical forgivable loan program, but for many of these businesses, this program alone will not provide the cash they need to retain workers, pay rent, and help their business come back to life when Americans are no longer sheltering in place. This essay calls on regulators to find new and creative ways to work with existing intermediaries, including banks and online lenders, who …

Making Consumer Finance Work, Natasha Sarin

All Faculty Scholarship

The financial crisis exposed major faultlines in banking and financial markets more broadly. Policymakers responded with far-reaching regulation that created a new agency—the CFPB—and changed the structure and function of these markets.

Consumer advocates cheered reforms as welfare-enhancing, while the financial sector declared that consumers would be harmed by interventions. With a decade of data now available, this Article presents the first empirical examination of the successes and failures of the consumer finance reform agenda. Specifically, I marshal data from every zip code and bank in the United States to test the efficacy of three of the most significant post-crisis …

Regulating Robo Advice Across The Financial Services Industry, Tom Baker, Benedict G. C. Dellaert

All Faculty Scholarship

Automated financial product advisors – “robo advisors” – are emerging across the financial services industry, helping consumers choose investments, banking products, and insurance policies. Robo advisors have the potential to lower the cost and increase the quality and transparency of financial advice for consumers. But they also pose significant new challenges for regulators who are accustomed to assessing human intermediaries. A well-designed robo advisor will be honest and competent, and it will recommend only suitable products. Because humans design and implement robo advisors, however, honesty, competence, and suitability cannot simply be assumed. Moreover, robo advisors pose new scale risks that …

Reconsidering The Separation Of Banking And Commerce, Mehrsa Baradaran

Scholarly Works

This Article examines the long-held belief that banking and commerce need to be kept separate to ensure a stable banking system. Specifically, the Article criticizes the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”), which prohibits nonbanking entities from owning banks. The recent banking collapse has caused and exacerbated several problematic trends in U.S. banking, especially the conglomeration of banking entities and the homogenization of assets. The inflexible and outdated provisions of the BHCA are a major cause of these trends. Since the enactment of the BHCA, the landscape of U.S. banking has changed dramatically, but the strict separation of banking and commerce …

Testimony Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Miami, Florida September 21, 2010, William K. Black

Faculty Works

"Control frauds" are seemingly legitimate entities controlled by persons that use them as a fraud "weapon." (The person that controls the firm is typically the CEO, so that term is used in this testimony.) A single control fraud can cause greater losses than all other forms of property crime combined. Neo-classical economic theory, methodology, and praxis combine to optimize criminogenic environments that hyper-inflate financial bubbles and produce recurrent, intensifying financial crises. A criminogenic environment is one that creates such perverse incentives that it leads to widespread crime. Financial control frauds’ "weapon of choice" is accounting. Neoclassical theory, which dominates law …

How Trust Is Abused In Free Markets: Enron’S 'Crooked 'E’', William K. Black

Faculty Works

A market can have a lemon's problem when one party to the transaction has far superior information to the other and defects are not obvious. The classic bad car, the "lemon" led to the name for this theory. A lemon's market is inefficient. Both consumers and reputable sellers of high quality goods are harmed by the consumer's inability to distinguish superior goods. Frauds, who sell poor quality goods by misrepresenting quality are the only winners. Markets beset by lemon's problems may be improved by government intervention, which can aid both consumers and honest sellers.

In his article "How Trust is …

Code, Crash, And Open Source: The Outsourcing Of Financial Regulation To Risk Models And The Global Financial Crisis, Erik F. Gerding

Publications

The widespread use of computer-based risk models in the financial industry during the last two decades enabled the marketing of more complex financial products to consumers, the growth of securitization and derivatives, and the development of sophisticated risk-management strategies by financial institutions. Over this same period, regulators increasingly delegated or outsourced vast responsibility for regulating risk in both consumer finance and financial markets to these privately owned industry models. Proprietary risk models of financial institutions thus came to serve as a "new financial code" that regulated transfers of risk among consumers, financial institutions, and investors.

The spectacular failure of financial-industry …

Those Who Forget The Regulatory Successes Of The Past Are Condemned To Failure, William K. Black

Faculty Works

This paper shows that the reregulation of the savings & loan (S&L) industry was successful because the regulators correctly identified the primary cause of the second phase of the debacle as an epidemic of “accounting control fraud” and took effective measures to contain such frauds. Control frauds occur when the persons controlling a seemingly legitimate organization use it as a “weapon” to defraud. In the financial sector, accounting control fraud is the “weapon of choice.” The regulators’ primary insights were (1) that lenders optimize accounting fraud by engaging in a distinctive operational pattern that would be irrational for any honest …

When Fragile Become Friable: Endemic Control Fraud As A Cause Of Economic Stagnation And Collapse, William K. Black

Book Chapters

Individual “control frauds” cause greater losses than all other property crime combined. They are financial super-predators. Control frauds are crimes by the head of state or CEO that use the nation or company as a “weapon.” Waves of “control fraud” can cause economic collapses, discredit institutions vital to governance, and erode trust. Fraud’s defining element is deceit – the criminal creates and then betrays trust. Fraud erodes trust. Endemic control fraud causes institutions and trust to crumble and produces economic stagnation.

Economic theory about fraud is underdeveloped, economists are not taught about fraud mechanisms, and economists minimize the incidence and …