Law Commons^™

Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, Steven C. Salop

All Faculty Scholarship

This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for purposes of antitrust analysis, what is 'market power' and/or 'monopoly power'? The question should be well settled because antitrust law requires proof of actual or likely market power or monopoly power to establish most types of antitrust violations.

Examination of key antitrust law opinions, however, shows that courts define 'market power' and 'monopoly power' in ways that are both vague and inconsistent. We conclude that the present level of confusion is unnecessary and results from two different but related errors:

(1) the belief or suspicion that …

Legal Reasoning And The Jurisprudence Of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations Of Neoclassical Economic Analysis In The Resolution Of Antitrust Disputes, John J. Flynn, James F. Ponsoldt

Scholarly Works

Cognizant of historical shifts in the methodology and standards applied in antitrust analysis, particularly in the analysis of vertical restraints, this Article first considers the underlying jurisprudential nature of legal reasoning as background for determining what the law of vertical restraints ought to be. The Article then explores the implications of substitution "economic analysis"--in the narrow sense of the economic analysis advocated by the Chicago School of "law and economics"--for legal reasoning in disputes arising under the antitrust laws. A more accurate, multivalued background for antitrust policy is explored. This Article finally proposes a method for analysis of vertical restraints …

The Contested Merger: Introduction And Fact Summary, Jonathan Baker

Presentations

"The Contested Merger" program arranged by the National Institute Committee of the Antitrust Section; and ABA's Division for Professional EducationThe program began with meetings set in corporate offices, in which the Yankee executives identified the business reasons behind the transaction, then consulted with in-house and outside counsel to assess the deal's antitrust risks and structure it. The transcript of this lesson in client counseling is reprinted following this introduction, as is the transcript of the panel discussion in which program participants offer a "reallife" analysis of the events of the program thus far.

Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Vertical restraints come in a glittering menu of exceptional variety, including resale price maintenance (RPM), tying, exclusive dealing, requirements contracts, "best efforts" clauses, full-line forcing, airtight and nonairtight exclusive territories, customer restrictions, areas of primary responsibility, profit-passover provisions, restrictions on locations of outlets, and dual distribution. Firms sometimes combine vertical restraints into packages. The great variety of individual and combined vertical restraints complicates the discovery of market effects. Indeed, identifying what restraint(s) a given firm is using at any particular time can be difficult.

An Anti-Antitrust Activist?; Podium, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

New Forces Chip Away At Agencies' Policy Of Antitrust Abandonment, Joe Sims, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust is at a crossroads. the federal agencies are dominated by the economic approach of the Chicago school, but congress and the states are expressing sharp dissent.

Why Price Correlations Don't Define Antitrust Markets: On Econometric Algorithms For Market Definition, Jonathan Baker

Working Papers

This paper compares two econometric methods that have been proposed for market definition: price correlations and residual demand curve estimation. Econometric theory is used to demonstrate that price correlations among firms will likely contain little or no information relevant to defining antitrust markets, under the assumption that a hypothetical cartel facing a downward sloping residual demand curve constitutes an antitrust market (defined according to the DOJ Guidelines). Hence price correlation analyses are likely to have little value for antitrust market definition. In terms of the literature on empirical techniques for market definition, this paper shows that if the econometric market …

Law And The Abuse Of Economic Power In Europe, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Practice And Procedure In The Formative Era: The Constitutional And Conceptual Reach Of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, James May

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.