Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Institution
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate History, David Luban, W. Bradley Wendel
Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate History, David Luban, W. Bradley Wendel
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The modern subject of theoretical legal ethics began in the 1970s. This brief history distinguishes two waves of theoretical writing on legal ethics. The “First Wave” connects the subject to moral philosophy and focuses on conflicts between ordinary morality and lawyers’ role morality, while the “Second Wave” focuses instead on the role legal representation plays in maintaining and fostering a pluralist democracy. We trace the emergence of the First Wave to the larger social movements of the 1960s and 1970s; in the conclusion, we speculate about possible directions for a Third Wave of theoretical legal ethics, based in behavioral ethics, …
Republicanism And Natural Rights At The Founding, Jud Campbell
Republicanism And Natural Rights At The Founding, Jud Campbell
Law Faculty Publications
Today we tend to think about natural rights as non-positivist claims to limits on governmental authority — typically claims derived from religion, morality, or logic. These “rights,” by their very definition, exist independent of governmental control. Indeed, that is what makes them “natural.” This Essay, responding to Randy Barnett's Our Republican Constitution, sketches a different view of Founding-Era natural rights, their relationship to governmental authority, and their enforceability. With the exception of certain “rights of the mind,” natural rights were not really “rights” at all, in the sense of being determinate legal privileges or immunities. Rather, embracing natural rights meant …
Punishment, Liberalism, And Public Reason, Chad Flanders
Punishment, Liberalism, And Public Reason, Chad Flanders
All Faculty Scholarship
The article argues for a conception of the justification of punishment that is compatible with a modern, politically liberal regime. Section I deals with what some have thought are the obvious social interests society has in punishing criminals, and tries to develop those possible interests somewhat sympathetically. Section II suggests that many of those reasons are not good ones if punishment is regarded (as it should be) from the perspective of political philosophy. Social responses to bad things happening to people cannot be grounded in controversial metaphysical views about what is good for people or what people deserve, but many …