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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Law
Agwara V. State Bar Of Nev., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 96 (Dec. 7, 2017) (En Banc), Lucy Crow
Agwara V. State Bar Of Nev., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 96 (Dec. 7, 2017) (En Banc), Lucy Crow
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries
The Court adopted the three-prong test in Grosso v. United States, and held that an attorney cannot assert the privilege against self-incrimination to withhold client trust documentation sought in a State Bar investigation. However, the State Bar must have a compelling reason to force disclosure of tax records.
19th Annual Open Government Summit: Access To Public Records Act & Open Meetings Act, 2017, Department Of Attorney General, State Of Rhode Island
19th Annual Open Government Summit: Access To Public Records Act & Open Meetings Act, 2017, Department Of Attorney General, State Of Rhode Island
School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events
No abstract provided.
Communitizing Transnational Regulatory Concerns, Sungjoon Cho, Cecilia Suh, Jacob Radecki
Communitizing Transnational Regulatory Concerns, Sungjoon Cho, Cecilia Suh, Jacob Radecki
All Faculty Scholarship
The conventional, rationalist view explains that a state will only assent to international regulation if such regulation directly serves the state’s interest. In contrast, nascent transnational regulatory intermediaries, such as the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee, seek to ameliorate such parochial state interests through a broader interstate dialogue. This Article addresses the challenging question of whether these intermediaries have any meaningful effect on the resolution of interstate trade disputes. To examine this question, this Article utilizes data from over 400 examples of “specific trade concerns” (STCs) raised by WTO members in the TBT Committee. Our …
Trending @ Rwu Law: Dean Yelnosky's Post: The Path To Commencement: Maria Viveiros '17 05-08-2017, Michael Yelnosky
Trending @ Rwu Law: Dean Yelnosky's Post: The Path To Commencement: Maria Viveiros '17 05-08-2017, Michael Yelnosky
Law School Blogs
No abstract provided.
Democracy, Law, Compliance, Don Herzog
Democracy, Law, Compliance, Don Herzog
Articles
Professors Schauer and McAdams both seek a more or less sweepingly general theory of why we obey the law. But we should split, not lump. There are different reasons different actors in different social settings obey different laws–not only, but not least, out of regard for democratic decision making.
Diversity, Compliance, Ethics & In-House Counsel, Steven A. Ramirez
Diversity, Compliance, Ethics & In-House Counsel, Steven A. Ramirez
Faculty Publications & Other Works
No abstract provided.
Coordinating Compliance Incentives, Veronica Root
Coordinating Compliance Incentives, Veronica Root
Faculty Scholarship
In today’s regulatory environment, a corporation engaged in wrongdoing can be sure of one thing: regulators will point to an ineffective compliance program as a key cause of institutional misconduct. The explosion in the importance of compliance is unsurprising given the emphasis that governmental actors — from the Department of Justice, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to even the Commerce Department — place on the need for institutions to adopt “effective compliance programs.” The governmental actors that demand effective compliance programs, however, have narrow scopes of authority. DOJ Fraud handles violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, while the …
Ancient Worries And Modern Fears: Different Roots And Common Effects Of U.S. And Eu Privacy Regulation, David Thaw, Pierluigi Perri
Ancient Worries And Modern Fears: Different Roots And Common Effects Of U.S. And Eu Privacy Regulation, David Thaw, Pierluigi Perri
Articles
Much legal and technical scholarship discusses the differing views of the United States and European Union toward privacy concepts and regulation. A substantial amount of effort in recent years, in both research and policy, focuses on attempting to reconcile these viewpoints searching for a common framework with a common level of protection for citizens from both sides of Atlantic. Reconciliation, we argue, misunderstands the nature of the challenge facing effective cross-border data flows. No such reconciliation can occur without abdication of some sovereign authority of nations, that would require the adoption of an international agreement with typical tools of international …
Coordinating Compliance Incentives, Veronica Root
Coordinating Compliance Incentives, Veronica Root
Journal Articles
In today’s regulatory environment, a corporation engaged in wrongdoing can be sure of one thing: regulators will point to an ineffective compliance program as a key cause of institutional misconduct. The explosion in the importance of compliance is unsurprising given the emphasis that governmental actors — from the Department of Justice, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to even the Commerce Department — place on the need for institutions to adopt “effective compliance programs.” The governmental actors that demand effective compliance programs, however, have narrow scopes of authority. DOJ Fraud handles violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, while the …
Laxity At The Gates: The Sec's Neglect To Enforce Control Person Liability, Marc I. Steinberg
Laxity At The Gates: The Sec's Neglect To Enforce Control Person Liability, Marc I. Steinberg
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
In recent years the SEC has repeatedly stressed the importance of holding gatekeepers accountable in order to promote effective corporate governance. In spite of these assertions, the Commission has failed to use two powerful tools at its disposal to pursue gatekeepers. Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act provides for liability against “control persons.” This Section imposes liability upon any person who controls another liable person to the same extent as such controlled person, unless she can establish that she acted in good faith and did not directly induce the violation. Sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6))A) of the Exchange Act give …
Cultures Of Compliance, Donald C. Langevoort
Cultures Of Compliance, Donald C. Langevoort
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
There has been a "cultural turn" in discussion and debates about the promise of corporate compliance efforts. These efforts are occurring quickly, without great confidence in their efficacy. Thus the interest in culture. This article explores what a culture of compliance means and why it is so hard to achieve. The "dark side" that enables non-compliance in organizations is powerful and often hidden from view, working via scripts that rationalize or normalize, denigrations of regulation, and celebrations of beliefs and attitudes that bring with them compliance dangers. The article addresses how both culture and compliance should be judged by those …
Probabilistic Compliance, Alex Raskolnikov
Probabilistic Compliance, Alex Raskolnikov
Faculty Scholarship
Uncertain legal standards are pervasive but understudied. The key theoretical result showing an ambiguous relationship between legal uncertainty and optimal deterrence remains largely undeveloped, and no alternative conceptual approaches to the economic analysis of legal uncertainty have emerged. This Article offers such an alternative by shifting from the well-established and familiar optimal deterrence theory to the new and unfamiliar probabilistic compliance framework. This shift brings the analysis closer to the world of legal practice and yields new theoretical insights. Most importantly, lower uncertainty tends to lead to more compliant positions and greater private gains. In contrast, the market for legal …