Law Commons^™

Are Bank Fiduciaries Special?, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

A growing body of post-crisis legal and economic literature suggests that future financial crises might be averted by tinkering with the internal governance structures of banks and other financial institutions. In particular, contributors to this literature propose tightening the fiduciary duties under which officers and directors of the relevant financial institutions labor. I argue in this symposium article that such proposals are doomed to failure under all circumstances save one - namely, that under which the relevant financial institutions are in whole or in part treated as publicly owned.

The argument proceeds in two parts. I first show that the …

Bank Governance And Systemic Stability: The "Golden Share" Approach, Saule T. Omarova

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 has sharply reframed the debate on the role of bank corporate governance as a mechanism of systemic crisis prevention. Among other things, it revealed how often the incentives of bank managers and shareholders to maximize short-term private gains are perfectly aligned as a matter of internal governance, but work directly against the broader public interest in preserving long-term financial stability. This Article accepts the existence of that built-in potential conflict as the critical starting point for answering the central question of post-crisis bank governance: How do we ensure that the board of directors of …

The Finance Franchise, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The dominant view of banks and other financial institutions is that they function primarily as intermediaries, managing flows of scarce funds from those who have accumulated them to those who have need of them and can pay for their use. This understanding pervades textbooks, scholarly writings, and policy discussions – yet it is fundamentally false as a description of how a modern financial system works. Finance today is no more primarily “intermediated” than it is pre-accumulated or scarce.

This Article challenges the outdated narrative of finance as intermediated scarce private capital and maps the basic structure and dynamics of the …

Brother, Can You Spare A Dollar? Designing An Effective Framework For Foreign Currency Liquidity Assistance, Dan Awrey

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The core principles of financial crisis management call upon central banks to lend freely, against good quality collateral, and at a penalty rate of interest, to solvent but illiquid banks and other financial institutions during periods of widespread panic and instability. While often taken for granted, these principles were designed for a world in which central banks have the capacity to create money denominated in the same currency as the one in which domestic banks and other financial institutions issue deposits and other short-term liabilities.

Unfortunately, this is not the world in which we live. The application of these principles …