Law Commons^™

Criminal Law And Common Sense: An Essay On The Perils And Promise Of Neuroscience, Stephen J. Morse

All Faculty Scholarship

This article is based on the author’s Barrock Lecture in Criminal Law presented at the Marquette University Law School. The central thesis is that the folk psychology that underpins criminal responsibility is correct and that our commonsense understanding of agency and responsibility and the legitimacy of criminal justice generally are not imperiled by contemporary discoveries in the various sciences, including neuroscience and genetics. These sciences will not revolutionize criminal law, at least not anytime soon, and at most they may make modest contributions to legal doctrine, practice, and policy. Until there are conceptual or scientific breakthroughs, this is my story …

Confessing In The Human Voice: A Defense Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, Andrew E. Taslitz

School of Law Faculty Publications

ABSTRACT OF CONFESSING IN THE HUMAN VOICE: A DEFENSE OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

By Andrew E. Taslitz

The privilege against self-incrimination has fallen on hard times. Miranda rights shrink, as do those more traditional “core” aspects of the privilege. Partly this is due to an implicit skepticism by the courts about the value of the privilege, despite their occasional explicit words of praise for its role in our constitutional scheme. Scholars largely, though not uniformly, agree that the privilege cannot be justified as a philosophical matter, viewing it as an unfortunate burden we are stuck with because of its …

Neuroscience, Free Will, And Criminal Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse

All Faculty Scholarship

This chapter argues that the folk-psychological model of the person and responsibility is not challenged by determinism in general or by neurodeterminism in particular. Until science conclusively demonstrates that human beings cannot be guided by reasons and that mental states play no role in explaining behavior, the folk-psychological model of responsibility is justified. This chapter discusses the motivations to turn to science to solve the hard normative problems the law addresses, as well as the law's psychology and its concepts of the person and responsibility. Then it considers the general relation of neuroscience to law, which I characterize as the …