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Full-Text Articles in Law
Overrides: The Super-Study, Victoria Nourse
Overrides: The Super-Study, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Overrides should be of interest to a far larger group of scholars than statutory interpretation enthusiasts. We have, in overrides, open inter branch encounters between Congress and the Courts far more typically found in the shadows of everyday Washington politics. Interestingly, Christiansen and Eskridge posit the court-congress relationship as more triadic than dyadic given the role played by agencies. One of their more interesting conclusions is that agencie are the big winners in the override game: agencies were present in seventy percent of the override cases and the agency view prevailed with Congress and against the Supreme Court in three-quarters …
Bond V. United States: Concurring In The Judgment, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz
Bond V. United States: Concurring In The Judgment, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Bond v. United States presented the deep constitutional question of whether a treaty can increase the legislative power of Congress. Unfortunately, a majority of the Court managed to sidestep the constitutional issue by dodgy statutory interpretation. But the other three Justices—Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—all wrote important concurrences in the judgment, grappling with the constitutional issues presented. In particular, Justice Scalia’s opinion (joined by Justice Thomas), is a masterpiece, eloquently demonstrating that Missouri v. Holland is wrong and should be overruled: a treaty cannot increase the legislative power of Congress.
Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent And History, Victoria Nourse
Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent And History, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article argues that theorists and practitioners of statutory interpretation should rethink two very basic concepts—legislative intent and legislative history. Textualists urge that to look to legislative history is to seek an intent that does not exist. This article argues we should put this objection to bed because, even if groups do not have minds, they have the functional equivalent of intent: they plan by using internal sequential procedures allowing them to project their collective actions forward in time. What we should mean by legislative “intent” is legislative “context.” For a group, context includes how groups act—their procedures. Once one …