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Full-Text Articles in Law

Rakoff Revisited, Roberta S. Karmel Jul 2014

Rakoff Revisited, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


An Overview Of The Fannie And Freddie Conservatorship Litigation, David J. Reiss Mar 2014

An Overview Of The Fannie And Freddie Conservatorship Litigation, David J. Reiss

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Remic Tax Enforcement As Financial-Market Regulator, Bradley T. Borden, David J. Reiss Jan 2014

Remic Tax Enforcement As Financial-Market Regulator, Bradley T. Borden, David J. Reiss

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta Karmel Jan 2014

Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta Karmel Jan 2014

Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks Of Hedging With Credit Derivatives, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher Jan 2014

Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks Of Hedging With Credit Derivatives, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

Is hedging with credit derivatives always beneficial? The benefit of hedging with credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps, is presumed by the Dodd-Frank Act, which excludes hedge transactions from much of the new financial regulation. Yet, significant new risks can arise when credit derivatives are used to manage risks. Hedging, therefore, should be defined not only in relation to whether a transaction offsets risks, but also whether, on balance, the risks that are mitigated—as well as any new risks that arise—are outweighed by the potential benefits.

Regulators of the derivatives markets must consider the risks of hedging with credit …


A People’S History Of Collective Action Clauses, Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati Jan 2014

A People’S History Of Collective Action Clauses, Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

For two decades, collective action clauses (CACs) have been part of the official-sector response to sovereign debt crisis, justified by claims that these clauses can help prevent bailouts and shift the burden of restructuring onto the private sector. Reform efforts in the 1990s and 2000s focused on CACs. So do efforts in the Eurozone today. CACs have even been suggested as the cure for the US municipal bond market. But bonds without CACs are still issued in major markets, so reformers feel obliged to explain why they know better. Over time, a narrative has emerged to justify pro-CAC reforms. It …


From Pigs To Hogs, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati Jan 2014

From Pigs To Hogs, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The question of whether, and to what extent, markets price contract terms in government bond issues has been one of considerable debate in the literature. We use a natural experiment thrown up by the Euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2013 to test whether a particular set of contract terms – ones that gave an advantage to sovereign guaranteed bonds over garden variety sovereign bonds – was priced. These contract terms turned out to be important for the holders of guaranteed bonds during the Greek debt restructuring of 2012, where they helped the holders of guaranteed bonds escape the haircut …


Putting The Securities Laws To The Test: The Long-Standing Approach To Federal Securities Regulation Is Not Working, Elisabeth De Fontenay Jan 2014

Putting The Securities Laws To The Test: The Long-Standing Approach To Federal Securities Regulation Is Not Working, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Lessons From Sec V. Citigroup: The Optimal Scope For Judicial Review Of Agency Consent Decrees, Dorothy S. Lund Jan 2014

Lessons From Sec V. Citigroup: The Optimal Scope For Judicial Review Of Agency Consent Decrees, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

On November 28, 2011, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Manhattan declined to approve a consent judgment between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Citigroup. Because Citigroup had not admitted or denied the allegations in the consent decree, Judge Rakoff concluded that he was unable to make an informed judgment about the merits of the settlement. Judge Rakoffs decision has garnered serious criticism from legal observers and rekindled discussion about the scope of judicial review of agency consent decrees, which have become a valuable agency enforcement tool. …


The Ftc And Privacy And Security Duties For The Cloud, Daniel J. Solove Jan 2014

The Ftc And Privacy And Security Duties For The Cloud, Daniel J. Solove

Faculty Scholarship

Third-party data service providers, especially providers of cloud computing services, present unique and difficult privacy and data security challenges. While many companies that directly collect data from consumers are bound by the promises they make to individuals in their privacy policies, cloud service providers are usually not a part of this arrangement. It is not entirely clear what, if any, obligations cloud service providers have to protect the data of individuals with whom they have no contractual relationship. This problem is especially acute because many institutions sharing personal data with cloud service providers fail to include significant privacy and security …


Money Market Funds Run Risk: Will Floating Net Asset Value Fix The Problem?, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Christopher M. Gandia Jan 2014

Money Market Funds Run Risk: Will Floating Net Asset Value Fix The Problem?, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Christopher M. Gandia

Faculty Scholarship

The instability of money market mutual funds (“MMF”), a relatively new form of financial intermediary that connects short-term debt issuers with funders who want daily liquidity, became manifest in the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a major issuer of money market debt, led one large fund to “break the buck” (that is, violate the $1 net asset valuation convention (“NAV”)) and triggered a run on other funds that was staunched only by major interventions from the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve. One common reform proposal has been to substitute “floating NAV” for “fixed NAV,” on …


Substituted Compliance And Systemic Risk: How To Make A Global Market In Derivatives Regulation, Sean J. Griffith Jan 2014

Substituted Compliance And Systemic Risk: How To Make A Global Market In Derivatives Regulation, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional wisdom is that the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 revealed faults in the ability of international financial regulation to contain the problem of systemic risk. Further conventional wisdom suggests that the failure to regulate comple


The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2014

The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Sec Adds A New Weapon: How Does The New Admission Requirement Change The Landscape?, Paul Radvany Jan 2014

The Sec Adds A New Weapon: How Does The New Admission Requirement Change The Landscape?, Paul Radvany

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past several years, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) has settled the vast majority of the cases it has brought. Some people have suggested, however, that settlements by public agencies such as the SEC should be scrutinized more closely. For instance, in a series of recent opinions, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York has “question[ed] the wisdom” of the SEC’s well-established practice of permitting defendants to enter into consent judgments while neither admitting nor denying the allegations. During the past two years, the SEC has implemented new policies that have altered its …


Taking Section 10(B) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement Of Sec Rules, Steve Thel Jan 2014

Taking Section 10(B) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement Of Sec Rules, Steve Thel

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has determined the scope of federal securities laws in a series of cases in which it has read section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act as either prohibiting certain misconduct or authorizing the SEC to regulate that conduct and only that conduct. Judging by the language, structure and history of the Exchange Act, the Court’s reading is wrong. Section 10(b) does not prohibit anything, and it neither grants the SEC rulemaking power nor limits the rulemaking power granted to the SEC elsewhere in the Exchange Act. Instead, section 10(b) simply triggers criminal sanctions for certain rule violations. …


Nationalization And Necessity: Takings And A Doctrine Of Economic Emergency, Nestor M. Davidson Jan 2014

Nationalization And Necessity: Takings And A Doctrine Of Economic Emergency, Nestor M. Davidson

Faculty Scholarship

Serious economic crises have recurred with regularity throughout our history. So too have government takeovers of failing private companies in response, and the downturn of the last decade was no exception. At the height of the crisis, the federal government nationalized several of the country’s largest private enterprises. Recently, shareholders in these firms have sued the federal government, arguing that the takeovers constituted a taking of their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This Essay argues that for the owners of companies whose failure would raise acute economic spillovers, nationalization without the obligation to pay just …


Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics Of Resistance Against Ifrs, Martin Gelter, Zehra Kavame Eroglu Jan 2014

Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics Of Resistance Against Ifrs, Martin Gelter, Zehra Kavame Eroglu

Faculty Scholarship

The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) has been debated in the United States since at least the accounting scandals of the early 2000s. While publicly traded firms around the world are increasingly switching to IFRS, often because they are required to do so by law or by their stock exchange, the Securities Exchange Com-mission (“SEC”) seems to have become more reticent in recent years. Only foreign issuers have been permitted to use IFRS in the United States since 2007. By contrast, the EU has mandated the use of IFRS in the consolidated financial statements of publicly traded firms …


Liability And Admission Of Wrongdoing In Public Enforcement Of Law, Samuel W. Buell Jan 2014

Liability And Admission Of Wrongdoing In Public Enforcement Of Law, Samuel W. Buell

Faculty Scholarship

Some judges and scholars have questioned the social value of the standard form in which the Securities and Exchange Commission settles its corporate enforcement actions, including the agency’s use of essentially unreviewed consent decrees that include no admission of liability or wrongdoing. This essay for a symposium on SEC enforcement provides an analysis of the deterrent effects of the three main components of settlements in public enforcement of law: liability, admission, and remedy. The conclusions are the following. All three components have beneficial deterrent effects. Cost considerations nonetheless justify some settlements that dispense with liability or admission, or even both. …


Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2014

Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines how a U.S. debt default might occur, how it could be avoided, its potential consequences if not avoided, and how those consequences could be mitigated. To that end, the article differentiates defaults caused by insolvency from defaults caused by illiquidity. The latter, which are potentiated by rollover risk (the risk that the government will be temporarily unable to borrow sufficient funds to repay its maturing debt), are not only plausible but have occurred in the past. Moreover, the ongoing controversy over the federal debt ceiling and the rise of the shadow-banking system make these types of defaults …


The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2014

The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

In an earlier article, I argued that shadow banking — the provision of financial services and products outside of the traditional banking system, and thus without the need for bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds — is so radically transforming finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink their basic assumptions. This article attempts to rethink the corporate governance assumption that owners of firms should always have their liability limited to the capital they have invested. In the relatively small and decentralized firms that dominate shadow banking, equity investors tend to be active managers. Limited liability gives …


Brief Of Financial Economists As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondents, Ernest A. Young Jan 2014

Brief Of Financial Economists As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondents, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Brief Of Common Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondents, Samuel W. Buell, Deborah A. Demott, James D. Cox, Ernest A. Young, Ann Lipton Jan 2014

Brief Of Common Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondents, Samuel W. Buell, Deborah A. Demott, James D. Cox, Ernest A. Young, Ann Lipton

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Towards More Sustainable And Less Crisis-Driven Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2014

Towards More Sustainable And Less Crisis-Driven Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Does Board Independence Reduce The Cost Of Debt?, Michael Bradley, Dong Chen Jan 2014

Does Board Independence Reduce The Cost Of Debt?, Michael Bradley, Dong Chen

Faculty Scholarship

Using the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated change in listing standards as a natural experiment, we find that while board independence decreases the cost of debt when credit conditions are strong or leverage low, it increases the cost of debt when credit conditions are poor or leverage high. We also document that independent directors set corporate policies that increase firm risk. These results suggest that, acting in the interest of shareholders, independent directors are increasingly costly to bondholders with the intensification of the agency conflict between these two stakeholders.


The Gathering Storm: Restructuring Sovereign Contingent Liabilities, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati Jan 2014

The Gathering Storm: Restructuring Sovereign Contingent Liabilities, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The contingent liabilities of a sovereign, such as guarantees of the debts of third parties, can normally be kept off the balance sheet of the sovereign guarantor. That is their charm. As the debt to GDP ratios of many developed countries approach red-zone levels, contingent liabilities are increasingly being favored over direct, on-the-balance-sheet, borrowings.

But what happens if a country carrying large contingent liabilities needs to restructure its debt? The borrower dare not leave its contingent claims out of the restructuring. To do so would risk undermining the financial predicates of the sovereign’s economic recovery program should the beneficiaries of …


Bypassing Congress On Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options To Avoid Default, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2014

Bypassing Congress On Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options To Avoid Default, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Even a “technical” default by the United States on its debt, such as a delay in paying principal or interest due to Congress’s failure to raise the federal debt ceiling, could have serious systemic consequences, destroying financial markets and undermining job creation, consumer spending, and economic growth. The ongoing political gamesmanship between Congress and the Executive Branch has been threatening — and even if temporarily resolved, almost certainly will continue to threaten — such a default. The various options discussed in the media for averting a default have not been legally and pragmatically viable. This article proposes new options for …


Santa Anna And His Black Eagle: The Origins Of Pari Passu?, Benjamin Chabot, Mitu Gulati Jan 2014

Santa Anna And His Black Eagle: The Origins Of Pari Passu?, Benjamin Chabot, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most debated issues in international finance is the meaning of the pari passu clause in sovereign bonds. The clause is ubiquitous; it is in almost every single foreign-law sovereign bond out there. Yet, almost no one seems to agree on its meaning. One way to cut the Gordian knot is to track down the origins of the clause. Modern lawyers may have simply copied the clause from the documents of their predecessors without understanding its meaning. But surely the people who first drafted the clause knew what it meant. Four enterprising students at Duke Law School may …


Do The Securities Laws Matter? The Rise Of The Leveraged Loan Market, Elisabeth De Fontenay Jan 2014

Do The Securities Laws Matter? The Rise Of The Leveraged Loan Market, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

One of the enduring principles of federal securities regulation is the mantra that bonds are securities, while commercial loans are not. Yet the corporate bond and loan markets in the U.S. are rapidly converging, putting significant pressure on the disparity in their regulatory treatment. As securities, corporate bonds are subject to onerous public disclosure obligations and liability regimes, which corporate loans avoid entirely. This longstanding regulatory distinction between loans and bonds is based on the traditional conception of a commercial loan as a long-term relationship between the borrowing company and a single bank, in contrast to bonds, which may be …


Who Can’T Raise Capital? The Scylla And Charybdis Of Capital Formation, James D. Cox Jan 2014

Who Can’T Raise Capital? The Scylla And Charybdis Of Capital Formation, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

There has long been complaints that the heavy regulatory hand of Blue Sky Law administrators prevents capital formation by small issuers. Using data recently collected by the SEC, the article reasons that the problems capital starved small issuers encounter is not the state regulator. The problems are elsewhere. The paper explores whether intermediation may ultimately enable more startups to raise needed funds. For this to occur, however, the paper explores the formidable obstacles the broker must overcome in meeting demanding suitability requirements.