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Book Review, Economic Foundations Of International Law, By Eric A. Posner And Alan O. Sykes, Timothy L. Meyer
Book Review, Economic Foundations Of International Law, By Eric A. Posner And Alan O. Sykes, Timothy L. Meyer
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This essay reviews Eric Posner’s and Alan Sykes’ Economic Foundations of International Law. In the last ten years or so, economic analysis of international law has established itself as a mainstream discipline, providing insights into why international law is structured as it is, the conditions under which it is effective, and how it might be improved. Economic Foundations consolidates and extends these insights. As such, the book is destined to be a starting place for economic analysis of international law. The book is divided into five parts. Part I provides an introduction to international law and the tools necessary to …
From Contract To Legislation: The Logic Of Modern International Lawmaking, Timothy L. Meyer
From Contract To Legislation: The Logic Of Modern International Lawmaking, Timothy L. Meyer
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The future of international lawmaking is in peril. Both trade and climate negotiations have failed to produce a multilateral agreement since the mid-1990s, while the U.N. Security Council has been unable to comprehensively respond to the humanitarian crisis in Syria. In response to multilateralism’s retreat, many prominent commentators have called for international institutions to be given the power to bind holdout states — often rising or reluctant powers such as China and the United States — without their consent. In short, these proposals envision international law traveling the road taken by federal systems such as the United States and the …
In-Sourcing Corporate Responsibility For Enforcement Of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Larry D. Thompson
In-Sourcing Corporate Responsibility For Enforcement Of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Larry D. Thompson
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In this article I first review our nation's long-standing and active aversion to corporate corruption overseas, as principally embodied in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. I then explain how achievement of the FCPA's goals is undermined by the uncertainty in current federal enforcement policies and the consequent ambivalence toward self disclosure exhibited by multinational corporations. Finally, I argue that the only realistic way to make up the shortcomings in FCPA enforcement that flow from the Justice Department's limited resources is to motivate corporations themselves to police corruption in their foreign subsidiaries by giving them a concrete incentive in the form …