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Full-Text Articles in Law

Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics And Legal Scholarship, Gregory Klass, Kathryn Zeiler Jun 2013

Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics And Legal Scholarship, Gregory Klass, Kathryn Zeiler

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Endowment theory holds the mere ownership of a thing causes people to assign greater value to it than they otherwise would. The theory entered legal scholarship in the early 1990s and quickly eclipsed other accounts of how ownership affects valuation. Today, appeals to a generic “endowment effect” can be found throughout the legal literature. More recent experimental results, however, suggest that the empirical evidence for endowment theory is weak at best. When the procedures used in laboratory experiments are altered to rule out alternative explanations, the “endowment effect” disappears. This and other recent evidence suggest that mere ownership does not …


A Skeptic’S Case For Sovereign Bankruptcy, Anna Gelpern Apr 2013

A Skeptic’S Case For Sovereign Bankruptcy, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay describes fundamental flaws in the sovereign debt restructuring regime, but questions the prevailing arguments for sovereign bankruptcy. The author concludes that efficient debt outcomes may well come about without bankruptcy, but that a statutory regime is necessary to achieve sovereign autonomy and political legitimacy.


Euro Zone Crisis Management And The New Social Europe, Philomila Tsoukala Jan 2013

Euro Zone Crisis Management And The New Social Europe, Philomila Tsoukala

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article analyzes the changes in European governance since the beginning of the euro crisis in relation to the project of constructing Social Europe. The article tracks the incorporation of a structural reform agenda originally designed as bailout conditionality for countries on the verge of default into EU economic governance as a strategy for growth. Beyond the contestable grounds of this reform agenda, its adoption by the EU in the mode of crisis management poses serious questions of legitimacy. The new enhanced economic coordination process includes obligatory guidelines in domains under the legislative competence of Member States, such as labor …


Narratives Of The European Crisis And The Future Of (Social) Europe, Philomila Tsoukala Jan 2013

Narratives Of The European Crisis And The Future Of (Social) Europe, Philomila Tsoukala

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article examines two distinct types of narratives prevalent in academic writing and popular press regarding the causes of the crisis in Europe. The first type, a morality tale, attributes the crisis to profligate southern states that refused to abide by the strictures of the Stability and Growth Pact. The second type is focused on the structural reasons for the crisis, emphasizing the nature of the European Union as a non-optimal currency area, and the euro as a factor in the creation of trade imbalances and competitiveness problems within the euro zone. Each type of narrative suggests a different type …


Banks And Governments: An Arial View, Anna Gelpern Jan 2013

Banks And Governments: An Arial View, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Financial systems and public treasuries are communicating vessels: strength or weakness in one flows to the other, and back. This chapter considers the implications of this insight using case studies from Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The connection is not unique to Europe, although it does not always result in feedback effects, or the ‘doom loop’ that has made headlines since 2010. Events now known as banking or government debt crises often have had elements of both, and could have gone either way. Policy and political choices determined their path. In all cases, governments were as indispensable for resolving banking …


Contract Hope And Sovereign Redemption, Anna Gelpern Jan 2013

Contract Hope And Sovereign Redemption, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Sovereign immunity has served as a partial substitute for bankruptcy protection, but it has encouraged a minority of creditors to pursue unorthodox legal remedies with spillover effects far beyond the debtor-creditor relationship. The attempt to enforce Argentina’s pari passu clause in New York is an example of such a remedy, which relies primarily on collateral damage to other creditors and market infrastructure to obtain settlement from a debtor that would not pay. The District Court decision, now on appeal before the Second Circuit, may not make holding out more attractive in future restructurings – but it would make participation less …


Distinguishing Probability Weighting From Risk Misperceptions In Field Data, Levon Barseghyan, Francesca Molinari, Ted O'Donoghue, Joshua C. Teitelbaum Jan 2013

Distinguishing Probability Weighting From Risk Misperceptions In Field Data, Levon Barseghyan, Francesca Molinari, Ted O'Donoghue, Joshua C. Teitelbaum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The paper outlines a strategy for distinguishing rank-dependent probability weighting from systematic risk misperceptions in field data. Our strategy relies on singling out a field environment with two key properties: (i) the objects of choice are money lotteries with more than two outcomes and (ii) the ranking of outcomes differs across lotteries. We first present an abstract model of risky choice that elucidates the identification problem and our strategy. The model has numerous applications, including insurance choices and gambling. We then consider the application of insurance deductible choices and illustrate our strategy using simulated data.


Overview And Operation Of U.S. Financial Sanctions, Including The Example Of Iran, Barry E. Carter, Ryan Farha Jan 2013

Overview And Operation Of U.S. Financial Sanctions, Including The Example Of Iran, Barry E. Carter, Ryan Farha

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Financial sanctions are increasingly being used in the mix of international economic sanctions being employed by the United Nations, regional entities, and individual countries, including the United States. These financial sanctions have become more focused and effective as the tools and techniques have improved significantly for tracing and identifying the financial transactions of terrorists, weapons proliferators, human rights violators, drug cartels, and others. These sanctions can not only freeze financial assets and prohibit or limit financial transactions, but they also impede trade by making it difficult to pay for the export or import of goods and services.

In spite of …


Carrots, Sticks, And Salience, Brian Galle Jan 2013

Carrots, Sticks, And Salience, Brian Galle

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article considers the second-best design of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies in the presence of agents who are imperfectly aware of the instrument. Until very recently, the price instrument literature has assumed perfect rationality, and even the handful of prior attempts to account for “hidden” prices focus mainly on the income tax. I extend these efforts in several directions. First, I show that the best available instrument for correcting negative externalities is often one whose price is partially adjusted upwards -- or, in the case of subsidies, downwards -- to counter-act the neglect of irrational actors. In addition, I argue …


The Wonder-Clause, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati Jan 2013

The Wonder-Clause, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Greek debt crisis prompted EU officials to embark on a radical reconstruction of the European sovereign debt markets. Prominently featured in this reconstruction was a set of contract provisions called Collective Action Clauses, or CACs. CACs are supposed to help governments and private creditors to renegotiate unsustainable debt contracts, and obviate the need for EU bailouts. But European sovereign debt contacts were already amenable to restructuring; adding CACs could make it harder. Why, then, promote CACs at all, and cast them in such a central role in the market reform initiative? Using interviews with participants in the initiative and …