Law Commons^™

Independent Directors And Shared Board Control In Venture Finance, Brian J. Broughman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In most VC-backed firms neither the entrepreneurs nor the VC investors control the board. Instead control is typically shared with a mutually appointed independent director holding the tie-breaking seat. Contract theory, which treats control as an indivisible right held by one party, does not have a good explanation for this practice. Using a bargaining game similar to final offer arbitration, I show that an independent director as tie-breaker can reduce holdup by moderating each party’s ex post threat position, potentially expanding the range of firms which receive external financing. This project contributes to the literature on incomplete contracting and holdup, …

The Varieties Of Comparative Institutional Analysis, Daniel H. Cole

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This paper, written as a contribution to a festchrift in honor of Neil Komesar, subjects his "comparative institutional analysis" (CIA) to a comparative analysis with various other social-scientific approaches to CIA.

Neil Komesar is among the very few legal scholars who has taken to heart Ronald Coase's call for comparative institutional analysis (CIA) of alternative "social arrangements." While Komesar has plowed a relatively lonely furrow in the legal academy, scholars from across the social sciences have been engaged in CIA (broadly defined), using various terminologies, methodologies, and evaluative criteria. This paper takes a pluralistic approach to understanding the differences in …