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Full-Text Articles in Law

Courts, Social Change, And Political Backlash, Michael Klarman Mar 2011

Courts, Social Change, And Political Backlash, Michael Klarman

Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture

On March 31, 2011, Professor of Law, Michael Klarman of Harvard Law School delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s thirty-first annual Philip A. Hart Lecture: “Courts, Social Change, and Political Backlash.” Included here are the speaker's notes from this lecture.

Michael Klarman is the Kirkland & Ellis Professor at Harvard Law School. Formerly, he was the James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law, Professor of History, and the Elizabeth D. and Richard A. Merrill Research Professor at the University of Virginia School of Law. Klarman specializes in the constitutional history of race.

Klarman holds a J.D. from Stanford Law School, a D.Phil. …


India And Pakistan: A Tale Of Judicial Appointments, Shubhankar Dam Mar 2011

India And Pakistan: A Tale Of Judicial Appointments, Shubhankar Dam

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

Recent judicial appointments in India and Pakistan have led to battles between their respective judicial and executive branches. In a moment of remarkable constitutional coincidence, two appointments were set aside in India and Pakistan last week. First, India's Supreme Court invalidated the appointment of P. J. Thomas to the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). Days later, Pakistan's Supreme Court invalidated Deedar Shah's appointment to the National Accountability Bureau (NAB).


The Firm As Cartel Manager, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Christopher R. Leslie Jan 2011

The Firm As Cartel Manager, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Christopher R. Leslie

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust law is the primary legal obstacle to price fixing, which is condemned by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Firms that engage in price fixing may try to reduce their probability of antitrust liability in a number of ways. First, members of a price-fixing conspiracy go to great lengths to conceal their illegal activities from antitrust enforcers. Second, because Section 1 condemns only concerted action, firms may structure their relationship to appear to be the action of a single entity that is beyond the reach of Section One.

In its American Needle decision the Supreme Court held that the …