Law Commons^™

Disparate Impact Realism, Amy L. Wax

All Faculty Scholarship

In Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the doctrine, first articulated by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), that employers can be held liable under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for neutral personnel practices with a disparate impact on minority workers. The Griggs Court further held that employers can escape liability by showing that their staffing practices are job related or consistent with business necessity.

In the interim since Griggs, social scientists have generated evidence undermining two key assumptions behind that decision and its …

Excluding Unemployed Workers From Job Opportunities: Why Disparate Impact Protections Still Matter, Helen Norton

Publications

No abstract provided.

Ricci V. Destefano: Diluting Disparate Impact And Redefining Disparate Treatment, Ann C. Mcginley

Scholarly Works

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits plaintiffs to bring discrimination cases under two different theories: disparate treatment, which requires a showing of the employer’s discriminatory intent, and disparate impact, which holds the employer liable absent intent to discriminate if it uses neutral employment policies or practices that have a disparate impact on a protected group. Ricci v. DeStefano significantly affects the interpretation of both of these theories of discrimination.

Ricci adopts a restrictive interpretation of the disparate impact theory that is inconsistent with Congressional intent and purpose, and signals that intentional discrimination is more important than …

From Wards Cove To Ricci: Struggling Against The Built-In Headwinds Of A Skeptical Court, Melissa Hart

Publications

When the Supreme Court in 1971 first recognized disparate impact as a legal theory under Title VII, the Court explained that the "absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." Forty years later, it is the built-in headwinds of a Supreme Court skeptical of - perhaps even hostile to - the goals of disparate impact theory that pose the greatest challenge to continued movement toward workplace equality. The essay examines the troubled trajectory that disparate impact law has taken in the …

Is Integration A Discriminatory Purpose?, Michelle Adams

Articles

Is integration a form of discrimination? Remarkably, recent Supreme Court doctrine suggests that the answer to this question may well be yes. In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court characterizes - for the very first time - government action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability and to integrate the workplace as "race-based," and then invalidates that action under a heightened level of judicial review. Consequently, Ricci suggests that the Court is open to the "equivalence doctrine," which posits that laws intended to racially integrate are morally and constitutionally equivalent to laws intended to racially separate. Under the equivalence doctrine, integration is simply …