Law Commons^™

The Year In Economics At The Fcc, 2010-11: Protecting Competition Online, Jonathan Baker, Mark Bykowsky, Patrick Degraba, Paul Lafontaine, Eric Ralph, William Sharkey

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission focused on protecting competition in developing online markets. Our review discusses important economic issues that are raised by the FCC’s Open Internet rulemaking (which is commonly referred to as “net neutrality”) and its review of Comcast’s programming joint venture with General Electric’s NBC Universal affiliate. The Open Internet rule focused on established online markets, while the Comcast/NBCU transaction addressed nascent competition online along with competition in video programming and distribution offline.

S11rs Sgr No. 7 (Tiger Girls & Gg), Harding

Student Senate Enrolled Legislation

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Merger Efficiencies In The Shadow Of The Law, D. Daniel Sokol, James A. Fishkin

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Essay provides an overview of U.S. antitrust merger practice in addressing efficiencies both in terms of actual practice before the agencies and in scholarly work as a response to Jamie Henikoff Moffitt's Vanderbilt Law Review article Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency Analysis. Moffitt’s analysis could have benefited from a more thorough discussion of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s (collectively, the “agencies”) analysis of efficiencies during investigations and the broader process of negotiations involving mergers. For instance, the article does not discuss the empirical work addressing when the agencies …

Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper discusses the theory and experience of United States courts concerning the quantification of harm in antitrust cases. This treatment pertains to both the social cost of antitrust violations, and to the private damage mechanisms that United States antitrust law has developed. It is submitted for the Roundtable on the Quantification of Harm to Competition by National Courts and Competition Agencies, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Feb., 2011.

In a typical year more than 90% of antitrust complaints filed in the United States are by private plaintiffs rather than the federal government. Further, when the individual states …

Does The Packers And Stockyards Act Require Antitrust Harm?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The Packers and Stockyards Act was enacted in 1921. Congress was plainly influenced by the 1919 publication of a Federal Trade Commission Report on the meatpacking industry. Consistent with the FTC’s jurisdiction and concerns, the Report dealt with deceptive and unfair practices as well as practices that were believed to violate the antitrust laws. The language of the PSA does much the same, mixing the two. Of its seven specific prohibitions, three contain antitrust-like provisions requiring a lessening of competition. Two others reach unfair and tort-like conduct without any requirement of harm to competition. The remaining two reach both anticompetitive …

Toward A Unified Theory Of Exclusionary Vertical Restraints, Daniel A. Crane, Graciela Miralles

Articles

The law of exclusionary vertical restraints-contractual or other business relationships between vertically related firms-is deeply confused and inconsistent in both the United States and the European Union. A variety of vertical practices, including predatory pricing, tying, exclusive dealing, price discrimination, and bundling, are treated very differently based on formalistic distinctions that bear no relationship to the practices' exclusionary potential. We propose a comprehensive, unified test for all exclusionary vertical restraints that centers on two factors: foreclosure and substantiality. We then assign economic content to these factors. A restraint forecloses if it denies equally efficient rivals a reasonable opportunity to make …

Provigil: A Commentary, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Michael Carrier's case study on Provigil' offers new support for the view that Big Pharma is to blame for stymieing competition, retarding innovation, and inflating prices in the drug industry. Carrier argues that Cephalon was able to thwart generic entry by a combination of anticompetitive strategies. It entered into a reverse payment settlement agreement with generics seeking to enter the market. These settlements purported to allow generic entry before the expiration of the patent period, but, according to Carrier, the promise of early entry was negated by the second prong of Cephalon's anticompetitive strategy. During the time that it had …

Reconsidering Competition, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

In light of the financial crisis and the empirical findings from behavioral economics, policymakers should reconsider the fundamental question: What is competition? Only in understanding competition can one understand what competition can or cannot achieve under certain circumstances.

This Article reexamines one premise of competition, namely the extent to which firms, consumers, and the government are rational and act with perfect willpower. In varying this assumption, the Article maps four scenarios of competition.

Competition authorities should revisit their conception of competition, including the underlying assumptions, to better understand the competitive dynamics in different industries. In engaging in this review, competition …

Why Copperweld Was Actually Kind Of Dumb: Sound, Fury, And The Once And Still Missing Antitrust Theory Of The Firm?, Chris Sagers

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Since even before Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), it has been thought that antitrust needs some "theory of the firm" to inform its application of a "single-entity" defense in Sherman Act section 1 litigation. Not only is that sense mistaken, it is emblematic of the deep misdirection of contemporary antitrust. It shows just how far antitrust has forgotten that it is a law, a practical tool to implement policy choices made through our system of government. Much too much of the time, it seems to fancy itself rather an abstract policy seminar to be …

Property In Law: Government Rights In Legal Innovations, Stephen Clowney

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

One of the most enduring themes in American political thought is that competition between states encourages legal innovation. Despite the prominence of this story in the national ideology, there is growing anxiety that state and local governments innovate at a socially suboptimal rate. Academics have recently expressed alarm that the pace of legal experimentation has become "extraordinarily slow," "inefficient," and "less than ideal." Ordinary citizens, too, seem concerned that government has been leeched of imagination and the dynamic spirit of experimentation; both talk radio programs and newspapers remain jammed with complaints about legislative gridlock and do-nothing politicians who cannot, or …

Passing Off And Unfair Competition: Conflict And Convergence In Competition Law, Mary Lafrance

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Behavioral Antitrust, Maurice E. Stucke, Amanda P. Reeves

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

Competition policy is entering a new age. Interest in competition laws has increased world-wide, and the United States no longer holds a monopoly on antitrust policy. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the question for competition authorities is whether and to what extent does bounded rationality, self-interest and willpower matter.

This article explores how the behavioral economics literature will advance competition policy. With increasing interest in the United States and abroad in the implications of behavioral economics for competition policy, this Article first provides an overview of behavioral economics. It next discusses how the assumption of rational, self-interested profit-maximizers …

The Ftc, Ip, And Ssos: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination, F. Scott Kieff, Richard A. Epstein, Daniel F. Spulber

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

In its recent report entitled “The Evolving IP Marketplace,” the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) advances a far-reaching regulatory approach (Proposal) whose likely effect would be to distort the operation of the intellectual property (IP) marketplace in ways that will hamper the innovation and commercialization of new technologies. The gist of the FTC Proposal is to rely on highly non-standard and misguided definitions of economic terms of art such as “ex ante” and “hold-up,” while urging new inefficient rules for calculating damages for patent infringement. Stripped of the technicalities, the FTC Proposal would so reduce the costs of infringement by downstream …

Standardization And Markets: Just Exactly Who Is The Government, And Why Should Antitrust Care?, Christopher L. Sagers

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

We take for granted that the basic choice in public policy is between allocation of resources by government bureaucracy, on the one hand, or allocation by markets, on the other. But that dichotomy is false, and at least under contemporary circumstances it is more accurate to describe the choice as between allocation by one kind of bureaucracy and allocation by a different kind of bureaucracy. This poses a problem for our antitrust policy, because it lacks any coherent guidance as to how to address those entities and transactions that are not governmental but are also not simply market-governed. This paper …

Patent Settlements, Risk, And Competition, Mark R. Patterson

Faculty Scholarship

PowerPoint presentation delivered at the session, Patent Settlements: The Issues Beyond the "Reverse Payment" Cases at the ABA 59th Annual Antitrust Spring Meeting, March 30, 2011.

Removing Property From Intellectual Property And (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts On Innovation And Competition, F. Scott Kieff

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Commentators have poured forth a loud and sustained outcry over the past few years that sees property rule treatment of intellectual property (IP) as a cause of excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold-outs, and trolls, which unduly tax and retard innovation, competition, and economic growth. The popular response has been to seek a legislative shift towards some limited use of weaker, liability rule treatment, usually portrayed as “just enough” to facilitate transactions in those special cases where the bargaining problems are at their worst and where escape hatches are most needed. This essay is designed to make two contributions. …

Antitrust Merger Efficiencies In The Shadow Of The Law, D. Daniel Sokol, James A. Fishkin

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Essay provides an overview of U.S. antitrust merger practice in addressing efficiencies both in terms of actual practice before the agencies and in scholarly work as a response to Jamie Henikoff Moffitt's Vanderbilt Law Review article Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency Analysis. Moffitt’s analysis could have benefited from a more thorough discussion of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s (collectively, the “agencies”) analysis of efficiencies during investigations and the broader process of negotiations involving mergers. For instance, the article does not discuss the empirical work addressing when the agencies …