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Full-Text Articles in Law

Multiple Communities And Controlling Corruption, Philip M. Nichols Oct 2009

Multiple Communities And Controlling Corruption, Philip M. Nichols

Legal Studies and Business Ethics Papers

Corruption presents an assurance problem to businesses: all businesses are best off if none act corruptly but in the event that corruption occurs are better off if they act corruptly than if they do not, and because there is no assurance that other actors are not cheating a business does not know how to act. The usual solution to an assurance problem – criminal sanctions imposed on cheaters – does not work in a corrupt system. Integrative Social Contract Theory suggests a solution to the assurance problem. Application of Integrative Social Contract Theory to corruption demonstrates that in the case of corruption ...


The Effects Of Tort Reform On Medical Malpractice Insurers' Ultimate Losses, Patricia Born, W. Kip Viscusi, Tom Baker Mar 2009

The Effects Of Tort Reform On Medical Malpractice Insurers' Ultimate Losses, Patricia Born, W. Kip Viscusi, Tom Baker

Health Care Management Papers

Whereas the literature evaluating the effect of tort reforms has focused on the impact of reforms on insurers' reported incurred losses, this article examines the ultimate effects of reforms using the developed losses from a comprehensive sample of insurers writing medical malpractice insurance from 1984 to 2003. Noneconomic damages caps are particularly influential in reducing medical malpractice losses and increasing insurer profitability. The long‐run effects of these reforms are greater than insurers' expected effects; for example, 5‐ and 7‐year developed loss ratios are below the initially reported incurred loss ratios for those years following the enactment of noneconomic ...


Contracting In The Presence Of Judicial Agency, Philip Bond Jan 2009

Contracting In The Presence Of Judicial Agency, Philip Bond

Finance Papers

While a key function of contracts is to provide incentives, the incentives of judges to enforce the terms of a contract have rarely been examined. This paper develops a simple model of judicial agency in which judges are corrupt and can be bribed by contracting parties. Higher-powered contracts expose contracting parties to more frequent and more severe corruption, which in turn lessens the incentives actually provided by the contract. Consequently the model predicts that individuals will commonly refrain from writing high-powered contracts, even when such contracts would be valuable absent judicial agency. I show that similar implications can also be ...


The Moral Problem In Insider Trading, Alan Strudler Jan 2009

The Moral Problem In Insider Trading, Alan Strudler

Legal Studies and Business Ethics Papers

This article identifies the moral wrongness of insider trading. It examines the leading arguments for treating insider trading as morally wrong and suggests that these arguments are unpersuasive because they either rely on dubious empirical premises or assume normative premises that are equivalent to their conclusions. It concludes that it is the unconscientious dealings involved in insider trading that is the most persuasive moral basis for wrongfulness of insider trading.