Law Commons^™

Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …

The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, And Executive Compensation, D. A. Jeremy Telman

Law Faculty Publications

Despite its ubiquity in corporate law, the business judgment rule remains a doctrinal puzzle. Both courts and scholars offer different understandings of the Rule's role in litigation brought against corporate directors and different justifications for its deployment to insulate such directors from liability for breaches of fiduciary duties. This Article rejects all existing justifications for the Rule and argues that the Rule is no longer needed to protect directors from liability either because the justifications offered never made any sense or because directors are now protected by other, statutory means. Rather, the Rule is needed today not to protect directors, …

The Criminalization Of Corporate Law, Lisa M. Fairfax

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, David K. Millon

Scholarly Articles

None available.

When Fragile Become Friable: Endemic Control Fraud As A Cause Of Economic Stagnation And Collapse, William K. Black

Book Chapters

Individual “control frauds” cause greater losses than all other property crime combined. They are financial super-predators. Control frauds are crimes by the head of state or CEO that use the nation or company as a “weapon.” Waves of “control fraud” can cause economic collapses, discredit institutions vital to governance, and erode trust. Fraud’s defining element is deceit – the criminal creates and then betrays trust. Fraud erodes trust. Endemic control fraud causes institutions and trust to crumble and produces economic stagnation.

Economic theory about fraud is underdeveloped, economists are not taught about fraud mechanisms, and economists minimize the incidence and …

The Dilemma Of Odious Debts, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati, Robert B. Thompson

Center for Contract and Economic Organization

When a corrupt governmental regime borrows money in the name of the state, and then steals or squanders the proceeds, must the future citizens of that country repay the loan? The law says yes, but the moral instinct of most people says no.

The odious debt controversy is, at base, a struggle to find a workable legal doctrine that will avoid a morally repugnant result (visiting the sins of corrupt governors on innocent citizens), without undermining the legal basis of all sovereign borrowing. No counterparty, at least no commercial counterparty, would lend money to a sovereign believing that the loan …

Before Competition: Origins Of The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Frederick Tung

Faculty Scholarship

To the modern corporate scholar and lawyer, the internal affairs doctrine seems in the natural order ofthings. Corporate law is state law. Each corporation is formed under the law of its chosen state ofincorporation. To ensure consistency and predictability, that law must govern the corporation's internalaffairs. Yet the origin of such a doctrine is puzzling. Respecting the firm's choice of corporate law, thedoctrine forces state legislatures into competition to attract incorporations. But how did legislatures come to concede their traditional territorial regulatory authority, and instead agree to compete? This Article solves this puzzle, offering the first account of the doctrine's …

Structural Reform Prosecution, Brandon L. Garrett

Faculty Scholarship

In what I call a structural reform prosecution, prosecutors secure the cooperation of an organization in adopting internal reforms. No scholars have considered the problem of prosecutors seeking structural reform remedies, perhaps because until recently organizational prosecutions were themselves infrequent. In the past few years, however, federal prosecutors adopted a bold new prosecutorial strategy under which dozens of leading corporations entered into demanding settlements, including AIG, American Online, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Computer Associates, HealthSouth, KPMG, MCI, Merrill Lynch & Co, Monsanto, and Time Warner. To situate the DOJ's latest strategy, I frame alternatives to the pursuit of structural reform remedies …

Introducing The Law Of Nonprofit Organizations And Philanthropy, David A. Brennen

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

On January 5,2007, the Nonprofit and Philanthropy Law Section of AALS held its first program at the AALS Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. The program, entitled "State-Level Legal Reform of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations," was a fitting way to launch what should prove to be a valuable contribution to the study of law relating to nonprofit organizations and philanthropy. This burgeoning area of academic legal study is well poised to grow by leaps and bounds in the coming years due to its impact on many traditional areas of legal study, including tax law, corporate law, estate law, trust law, …