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Full-Text Articles in Law
A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert J. Rhee
A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert J. Rhee
Faculty Scholarship
Conventional wisdom says that economic surplus is created when the cost of litigation is foregone in favor of settlement, a theory flowing from the Coase Theorem. The cost-benefit analysis weighs settlement against the expected value of litigation net of transaction cost. This calculus yields the normative proposition that settlement is a superior form of dispute resolution and so most trials are considered errors. While simple in concept, the prevailing economic model is flawed. This article is a theoretical inquiry into the selection criteria of settlement and trial. It applies principles of financial economics to construct a pricing theory of legal …
It's About The Relationship: Collaborative Law In The Employment Context, Marcia L. Mccormick
It's About The Relationship: Collaborative Law In The Employment Context, Marcia L. Mccormick
All Faculty Scholarship
Work is central to American life and drives us in fundamental ways. And the workplace, as a result, dominates our lives. We are spending ever greater amounts of time in the workplace and less time in civic and social engagements. As a consequence, our relationships at work have become so significant that they are nearly as important to us as our family relationships. In fact, the employment relationship is similar to the family relationship in the emotional support from coworkers it can provide and in the financial support it provides. Because the employment relationship is so common and psychologically so …
Building The Emotionally Learned Negotiator, Erin Ryan
Building The Emotionally Learned Negotiator, Erin Ryan
Scholarly Publications
This piece reviews three recent books on the significance of emotion in negotiation and dispute resolution (Fisher & Shapiro: Beyond Reason: Using Emotions as You Negotiate; Peter Ladd: Mediation, Conciliation and Emotion: A Practitioner's Guide for Understanding Emotions in Dispute Resolution; and Lacey Smith: Get It! Street-Smart Negotiation at Work: How Emotions Get You What You Want), situating each work within a theory of practice for emotionally learned negotiators. After discussing the how the appearance of emotional sterility became synonymous with professionalism (and the toll this has taken on professional interaction), the piece sets forth a functional theory of emotion …
How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining The Courts' Roles And Deciding The Appropriate Number Of Trials, Settlement Signals, And Other Elements Needed To Administer Justice, John M. Lande
Faculty Publications
This article discusses how the U.S. court system can function optimally given declining trial rates and the limited resources available. The question of how much justice we can afford is a challenge that becomes more difficult as budgets fall behind the increasing demand for and cost of court services. Presumably most analysts would agree that courts should try cases when appropriate - and help litigants find just resolutions without trial when it is not needed. The courts' ability to provide trials in some cases is possible only if the vast majority of other cases are not tried.This article provides background …
On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow
On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow
Articles
It was once perceived, and still is commonly taught, that default rules in contract law must mimic efficient arrangements. Otherwise, these rules impose needless transaction costs upon parties who seek to opt out of them to reach more efficient positions. In settings where these costs are high, parties might find themselves "stuck" in a default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer. The strong version of this account-that the only factor that can make an inefficient default rule stick is the direct cost of drafting a tailored provision-has been gradually reappraised. It is by now recognized that factors beyond …
Anchoring, Information, Expertise, And Negotiation: New Insights From Meta-Analysis, Chris Guthrie, Dan Orr
Anchoring, Information, Expertise, And Negotiation: New Insights From Meta-Analysis, Chris Guthrie, Dan Orr
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this article, we conduct a meta-analysis of studies of simulated negotiations to explore the impact of an initial "anchor," typically an opening demand or offer, on negotiation outcomes. We find that anchoring has a significant impact on the deals that negotiators reach. We also explore whether negotiator experience and the information environment mitigate the influence of anchoring. We conclude by offering prescriptive advice, both "offensive" and "defensive," to negotiators.
A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert J. Rhee
A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert J. Rhee
UF Law Faculty Publications
Conventional wisdom says that economic surplus is created when the cost of litigation is foregone in favor of settlement, a theory flowing from the Coase Theorem. The cost-benefit analysis weighs settlement against the expected value of litigation net of transaction cost. This calculus yields the normative proposition that settlement is a superior form of dispute resolution and so most trials are considered errors. While simple in concept, the prevailing economic model is flawed. This article is a theoretical inquiry into the selection criteria of settlement and trial. It applies principles of financial economics to construct a pricing theory of legal …