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Full-Text Articles in Law

James Madison’S Celebrated Report Of 1800: The Transformation Of The Tenth Amendment, Kurt T. Lash Jan 2006

James Madison’S Celebrated Report Of 1800: The Transformation Of The Tenth Amendment, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

It has become commonplace to describe the Rehnquist Court as having staged a "Federalism Revolution." Although the current status of the Revolution is in dispute, historical treatment of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under Chief Justice Rehnquist no doubt will emphasize a resurgence of federalism and limited construction of federal power. Cases like Gregory v. Ashcroft, New York v. United States, United States v. Lopez, Printz v. United States, Alden v. Maine, and United States v. Morrison all share a common rule of interpretation: Narrow construction of federal power to interfere with matters believed best left under state control. The textual …


Tucker’S Rule: St. George Tucker And The Limited Construction Of Federal Power, Kurt T. Lash Jan 2006

Tucker’S Rule: St. George Tucker And The Limited Construction Of Federal Power, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

When Joseph Story published his Commentaries on the Constitution in 1833, he dedicated the work "To the Honorable John Marshall," whose "expositions of constitutional law enjoy a rare and extraordinary authority. They constitute a monument of fame far beyond the ordinary memorials of political and military glory." Throughout the Commentaries, Story generously quoted Chief Justice Marshall's great nationalist opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland, Gibbons v. Ogden, and Cohens v. Virginia and used them to construct a thoroughly nationalist reading of the federal Constitution. Along the way, Story seemingly dismantled prior states' rights interpretations of federal power, particularly St. George Tucker's …


Three Theories Of Substantive Due Process, Daniel O. Conkle Jan 2006

Three Theories Of Substantive Due Process, Daniel O. Conkle

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Substantive due process is in serious disarray, with the Supreme Court simultaneously embracing two, and perhaps three, competing and inconsistent theories of decisionmaking. The first two theories, historical tradition and reasoned judgment, have explicit and continuing support in the Court's decisions. Under the theory of historical tradition, substantive due process affords presumptive constitutional protection only to liberties that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." By contrast, the theory of reasoned judgment is far more expansive, permitting the Court to identify rights independently, through a process that amounts to philosophical analysis or political-moral reasoning. The third theory, evolving …


Constitutional Texting, Lawrence B. Solum Jan 2006

Constitutional Texting, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

"Constitutional Texting" introduces an account of constitutional meaning that draws on Paul Grice's distinction between "speaker's meaning" and "sentence meaning." The constitutional equivalent of speaker's meaning is "framer's meaning," the meaning that the author of the constitutional text intended to convey in light of the author's beliefs about the reader's beliefs about the author's intentions. The constitutional equivalent of sentence meaning is "clause meaning," the meaning that an ordinary reader would attribute to the text at the time of utterance without any beliefs about particular intentions on the part of the author. Clause meaning is possible because the words and …


The Supreme Court In Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, And The Future Of Unenumerated Rights, Lawrence B. Solum Jan 2006

The Supreme Court In Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, And The Future Of Unenumerated Rights, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay advances a formalist conception of constitutional stare decisis. The author argues that instrumentalist accounts of precedent are inherently unsatisfying and that the Supreme Court should abandon adherence to the doctrine that it is free to overrule its own prior decisions. These moves are embedded in a larger theoretical framework--a revival of formalist ideas in legal theory that he calls "neoformalism" to distinguish his view from the so-called "formalism" caricatured by the legal realists (and from some other views that are called "formalist").

In Part II, The Critique of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, the author sets the stage by …