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Series

2005

Liability

Articles 1 - 10 of 10

Full-Text Articles in Law

Spare The Rod, Spoil The Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, Lisa M. Fairfax Nov 2005

Spare The Rod, Spoil The Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, Lisa M. Fairfax

Faculty Scholarship

It appears that our society has tacitly agreed to spare corporate directors any significant legal liability—which includes both financial and incarceration—for failing to perform their duties as board members. Thus, over the last twenty years, there has been a virtual elimination of legal liability—particularly in the form of financial penalties—for directors who breach their fiduciary duty of care. This is true despite the fact that we entrust directors with the awesome responsibility of monitoring all of America's corporations as well as the officers and agents within those corporations. More surprisingly, this tacit agreement against legal liability for directors has persisted …

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Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith Mar 2005

Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith

All Faculty Scholarship

This Essay explores the connection between corporate governance and D&O insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, D&O insurance premiums provide the insurer’s assessment of a firm’s governance quality. Most basically, firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher D&O premiums. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent. Corporations lack the incentive to produce this disclosure themselves, and U.S. securities regulators do …

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Changing Paradigms: The Liability Of Corporate Groups In Germany, René Reich-Graefe Jan 2005

Changing Paradigms: The Liability Of Corporate Groups In Germany, René Reich-Graefe

Faculty Scholarship

The German law on affiliated companies and groups of companies ("Konzernrecht"), as embodied in the German Stock Corporation Act of 1965, as amended ("Aktiengesetz"), has often been credited for its innovative approach to the dichotomy of liability strategies relevant to corporate groups-viz., the traditional concept of entity liability based on the fundamental doctrine of the legal separateness of the corporate entity and, accordingly, resulting in a limitation of investor liability as the rule, and discrete and rare occurrences of what is almost poetically designated the "piercing of the corporate veil" ("DurchgriffshaJtung") as narrow and reluctantly crafted exceptions, and the more …

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The Effects Of Malpractice Tort Reform On Defensive Medicine, Heather M. O'Neill, Katherine D. Hennesy Jan 2005

The Effects Of Malpractice Tort Reform On Defensive Medicine, Heather M. O'Neill, Katherine D. Hennesy

Business and Economics Faculty Publications

Medical malpractice crises occur across states to differing degrees, thus the proposed changes in state tort reforms differ accordingly. The primary overt goals of tort reform aim to address: rising medical malpractice insurance rates, increased frequency and severity of awards, and the increased incidence of doctors shuttering offices or fleeing states due to untoward malpractice environments. A secondary goal of tort reform is to reduce health care costs attributed to malpractice costs. Clearly, as malpractice tort reforms are debated in state capitols and reforms take place, the effects of the reforms on the goals above can be examined. However, there …

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Lessons From The World Trade Center For Open Space Planning Generally And Boston's Big Data Specifically, Mary Clark Jan 2005

Lessons From The World Trade Center For Open Space Planning Generally And Boston's Big Data Specifically, Mary Clark

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This paper looks to several land use planning issues at stake in both the World Trade Center redevelopment and Central Artery/ Tunnel Project, offering some lessons for the future of public open space planning with respect to the inºuence of the press, the centrality of politics, the urgency of addressing public and private claims of land ownership, the need to engage the public, and seizing the opportunity to create new public transportation links.

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Regulation By Adaptive Management--Is It Possible?, J.B. Ruhl Jan 2005

Regulation By Adaptive Management--Is It Possible?, J.B. Ruhl

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Today's voluminous literature on adaptive management traces its roots to Professor C.S. Holling's seminal work, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management. Although almost thirty years have passed since he and his colleagues first described the adaptive management methodology, no work on the topic has improved on their core theory. Its essence is an iterative, incremental decisionmaking process built around a continuous process of monitoring the effects of decisions and adjusting decisions accordingly. It is in other words, far more suited to the needs of future regulatory challenges than is prescriptive regulation. My focus, however, is not on what adaptive management should …

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Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith Jan 2005

Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores the connection between corporate governance and directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, in a well-working insurance market, D&O insurance premiums would convey the insurer's assessment of a firm's governance quality. Simply stated, firms with better corporate governance would pay relatively low D&O premiums, while firms with worse corporate governance would pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the …

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Liability Insurance As Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law In Action, Tom Baker Jan 2005

Liability Insurance As Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law In Action, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

Leaving aside difficult to interpret doctrinal developments, such as the abrogation of traditional immunities, liability insurance has at least the following six impacts on tort law in action. First, for claims against all but the wealthiest individuals and organizations, liability insurance is a de facto element of tort liability. Second, liability insurance limits are a de facto cap on tort damages. Third, tort claims are shaped to match the available liability insurance, with the result that liability insurance policy exclusions become de facto limits on tort liability. Fourth, liability insurance makes lawsuits against ordinary individuals and small organizations into repeat …

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Spare The Rod, Spoil The Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, Lisa M. Fairfax Jan 2005

Spare The Rod, Spoil The Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, Lisa M. Fairfax

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

It appears that our society has tacitly agreed to spare corporate directors any significant legal liability - which includes both financial and incarceration - for failing to perform their duties as board members. Thus, over the last twenty years, there has been a virtual elimination of legal liability - particularly in the form of financial penalties - for directors who breach their fiduciary duty of care. This is true despite the fact that we entrust directors with the awesome responsibility of monitoring all of America's corporations as well as the officers and agents within those corporations. More surprisingly, this tacit …

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The Promise Of Internet Intermediary Liability, Ronald J. Mann, Seth R. Belzley Jan 2005

The Promise Of Internet Intermediary Liability, Ronald J. Mann, Seth R. Belzley

Faculty Scholarship

The Internet has transformed the economics of communication, creating a spirited debate about the proper role of federal, state, and international governments in regulating conduct related to the Internet. Many argue that Internet communications should be entirely self-regulated because such communications cannot or should not be the subject of government regulation. The advocates of that approach would prefer a no-regulation zone around Internet communications, based largely on the unexamined view that Internet activity is fundamentally different in a way that justifies broad regulatory exemption. At the same time, some kinds of activity that the Internet facilitates undisputedly violate widely shared …

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