Law Commons^™

Takings, Narratives, And Power, Gregory S. Alexander

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

"The Regulatory Takings Problem" is the title given to a story, or narrative, that has become prominent in the literature on just compensation issues. The story is one of power and fear. It is about a perceived imbalance of power between the two groups of actors involved in the process of public land-use regulation--private landowners and government regulators. It depicts scenarios of past or threatened abuse of power by local land-use regulators, and it looks to the takings clause generally and regulatory takings doctrine specifically as crucial corrective devices, essential to set the power imbalance aright. The dominant narrative describes …

Freedom, Coercion, And The Law Of Servitudes, Gregory S. Alexander

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

What do we want from a restatement of servitude law? Doctrinal simplification presents one obvious objective. Property teachers and their students commonly observe that the law of servitudes is a mess. However, doctrinal simplification surely does not present the only objective of the restatement. Developing a unified body of servitude doctrine, by itself, merely creates a sense of aesthetic coherence. Presumably the project aims at achieving more than just that. Law reformers generally seek to enhance the legal system's substantive coherence. At this level--developing a set of substantively coherent doctrinal practices--I am skeptical about the servitude restatement project.

A restatement …

A Coasean Experiment On Contract Presumptions, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Despite the theoretical importance of the Coase Theorem, scholars have given surprisingly little attention to verifying its predictions empirically. Supporters often accept the theorem as dogma, while armchair critics assail its assumptions. In an exciting series of recent articles, however, Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer have presented experimental evidence, as have others, that largely supports the Coasean prediction that bargainers will negotiate around inefficient property rights to reach a Pareto-optimal solution. The methodology has even gained sufficient attention to have its detractors.

The existing experiments analyze the results of bargains when one side has the power to impose unilaterally one …