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Full-Text Articles in Law
Negligence, Causation And Information, Stephen G. Marks
Negligence, Causation And Information, Stephen G. Marks
Faculty Scholarship
This note suggests a model to unify, in a simple information-based framework, the notion of negligence and the various notions of causation. In effect, the model demonstrates that negligence, probabilistic cause and cause-in-fact represent an identical concept applied to different information sets. This note uses the unified framework to develop a simple algorithm for the practical application of the principles of causation in the law of negligence.
Taking And Pursuing A Case: Some Observations Regarding "Legal Ethics" And Attorney Accountability, Richard H. Underwood
Taking And Pursuing A Case: Some Observations Regarding "Legal Ethics" And Attorney Accountability, Richard H. Underwood
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
This Article addresses some of the potential liabilities that may arise from an attorney's decision to decline, refer, undertake, continue or discontinue the prosecution of a civil action. This Article suggests that counsel's obligations to his or her client, adversary, and fellow members of the bar, as well as to the judiciary and the justice system, can be balanced without subjecting attorneys to liability. This balance can be attained, however, only if potential problems are spotted and minimal precautions are taken.
Retribution And Deterrence: The Role Of Punitive Damages In Products Liability Litigation, Richard C. Ausness
Retribution And Deterrence: The Role Of Punitive Damages In Products Liability Litigation, Richard C. Ausness
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
Punitive damages constitute an award to an injured party above what is necessary to compensate for actual loss. This Article considers whether punitive damages are an effective means of promoting the goals of products liability law. Section I traces the use of punitive damages in products liability litigation from the early 1960's to the present time. Section II examines the traditional rationales for punitive damages and considers whether they are appropriate in the products liability context. Finally, Section III evaluates some of the measures that commentators have proposed to adapt more fully the concept of punitive damages to products liability …
Application Of The Antitrust Laws To The Activities Of Insurance Companies: Heavier Risks, Expanded Coverage, And Greater Liability, Joseph Bauer, Earl W. Kintner, Michael J. Allen
Application Of The Antitrust Laws To The Activities Of Insurance Companies: Heavier Risks, Expanded Coverage, And Greater Liability, Joseph Bauer, Earl W. Kintner, Michael J. Allen
Journal Articles
Since 1945 Congress has exempted certain activities of insurance companies from federal antitrust scrutiny. This exemption, provided by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, is not unqualified; it only applies to insurance company activities that constitute the "business of insurance" and that already are regulated under state law. Moreover, the exemption does not apply to activities that involve boycotts, coercion, or intimidation. The purpose of this exemption was to preserve the long tradition of state regulation of insurance, while providing federal remedies for coercive anticompetitive activities. The authors examine recent Supreme Court interpretations of the Act in light of this legislative policy and …
Travelers Checks, James J. White
Travelers Checks, James J. White
Articles
A. Travelers Checks Defined 1. Courts have variously described travelers checks as certificates of deposit, negotiable instruments, securities, cash, and cashier's checks. 2. The most persuasive analysis seems to treat travelers checks as cashier's checks on which the issuer is both the drawer and the drawee, the purchaser once he has countersigned is the payee, and both the purchaser and the next recipient are indorsers.
Market Incentives For Safety, W. Kip Viscusi
Market Incentives For Safety, W. Kip Viscusi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In the heated atmosphere generated by inch-high headlines and multimillion-dollar liability suits, two important facts often get lost. First, society's awareness of what ensuring reasonably complete safety would cost rarely matches the intensity of its demands for such assurance. And second, the most powerful forces working to make products and workplaces safer are not the edicts of government but the dynamics of the market. True, there are situations in which the market cannot by itself create effective incentives for safety, but in the vast majority of cases it can-and does. Drawing on his extensive research into the regulation of risk, …