Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Law

Perpetuities: A Perspective On Wait-And-See, Lawrence W. Waggoner Jan 1985

Perpetuities: A Perspective On Wait-And-See, Lawrence W. Waggoner

Articles

Professor Dukeminier and I agree on most of the important points concerning perpetuity law and perpetuity reform. We agree that the Rule Against Perpetuities still serves a socially useful function of limiting dead hand control, and should not be abolished. We also agree that the common law Rule is needlessly harsh and should be softened. Finally, we agree on the type of reform that is most desirable-waitand- see. Our only disagreeihent-concerns the best method of marking off the wait-and-see perpetuity pe]iqod-the period of time during which dispositions that would have been invalid under the common law Rule are to be …


Book Review Of Passion: An Essay On Personality , Richard F. Devlin Frsc Jan 1985

Book Review Of Passion: An Essay On Personality , Richard F. Devlin Frsc

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

Passion is a cogently structured, compel Jingly argued and seductively enthralling masterpiece which, in years to come, will undoubtedly stand out as an inspirational source for many who seek social transformation. Unger's style, in this essay at least, is lucid and inviting. Substantively, Passion demonstrates not only the depth of his penetrating intellect but also his command of an array of' disciplines. Unger's polymathy is all the more impressive when we remember that ours is an era in which idiosyncratic specialization is the norm.


The Right And The Reasonable, George P. Fletcher Jan 1985

The Right And The Reasonable, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

As the common law relies on the concept of "reasonableness," the civil law relies on the concept of "Right." Professor Fletcher argues that reliance on reasonableness enables the common law to develop rules that can be voiced in a single standard. Such rules permit what Professor Fletcher terms 'flat" legal thinking. In contrast, the civil law's reliance on the concept of Right leads it to develop rules that proceed in two stages: the first rule asserts an absolute right; the second, a limitation based upon criteria other than Right. The application of such rules proceeds by what Professor Fletcher terms …


English Common Law In Virgina, William Hamilton Bryson Jan 1985

English Common Law In Virgina, William Hamilton Bryson

Law Faculty Publications

By statute the common law of England is the basis of the common law of modern Virginia. This reception statute refers to the customary, unwritten law of the kingdom of England, but only that part which was general and common to all parts of England. That the English common law is the foundation of the law of Virginia is a matter not merely of a modern statute but also of history and reason.


The Common Law Powers Of Federal Courts, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 1985

The Common Law Powers Of Federal Courts, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Lawmaking by federal courts has been a matter of controversy since the early days of the Republic. In the last forty years, the debate has fallen into roughly two periods, with Roe v. Wade marking the dividing line. During what might be called the "legal process" era of the 1950's and 1960's, scholarly energy was focused on Erie Railroad v. Tompkins and what was then called the "new federal common law." To be sure, important work on judicial review was also done in those years, particularly in the wake of the Supreme Court's dramatic decision in Brown v. Board of …


A Rejoinder By Professor Waggoner, Lawrence W. Waggoner Jan 1985

A Rejoinder By Professor Waggoner, Lawrence W. Waggoner

Articles

Since the patience of the reader and the space in this issue of the Law Review are nearing their limits, I wish to publish only two points in response to what Professor Dukeminier has written.. These points further support my position that Dukeminier's proposed statute would lead almost anyone to conclude that A, not X, is the causal relationship measuring life in Example 1 of my article.1 By implication, these points, along with the others made in my article, corroborate my overall thesis: Professor Dukeminier's proposed one-sentence statute2 cannot be counted a responsible way of identifying the measuring lives for …