Law Commons^™

Shareholder Voting In Proxy Contests For Corporate Control, Uncontested Director Elections And Management Proposals, Randall Thomas, Patrick C. Tricker

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This paper surveys the empirical literature on shareholder voting, specifically on votes related to contested and uncontested director elections and on management proposals. While much of current theory depicts shareholder votes as an ineffective control on the boards decision making, the empirical literature paints a more nuanced picture. When a proxy contest breaks out, shareholders wield immense influence. These contests tend to have significant benefits for the corporation, including facilitating a change in management, reducing unnecessary liquidity, and prompting the payout of dividends. Even in uncontested director elections, shareholders decisions to vote for or withhold their vote reflect the company's …

Quieting The Shareholders' Voice, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Dodd-Frank's Say On Pay: Will It Lead To A Greater Role For Shareholders In Corporate Governance?, Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter, James F. Cotter

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

"Say on pay" gives shareholders an advisory vote on a company's pay practices for its top executives. Beginning in 2011, Dodd-Frank mandated such votes at public companies. The first year of "say on pay" under the new legislation may have changed the dialogue and give-and-take in the shareholder-management relationship at some companies, particularly on the question of executive pay.

We study the evolution of shareholder voting on "say on pay" - beginning in 2006 as a fledgling shareholder movement to get "say on pay" on the corporate ballot, evolving as a handful of companies and later the financial firms receiving …

Corporate Voting, Paul H. Edelman, Robert B. Thompson

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Discussion of shareholder voting frequently begins against a background of the democratic expectations and justifications present in decision-making in the public sphere. Directors are assumed to be agents of the shareholders in much the same way that public officers are representatives of citizens. Recent debates about majority voting and shareholder nomination of directors illustrate this pattern. Yet the corporate process differs in significant ways, partly because the market for shares permits a form of intensity voting and lets markets mediate the outcome in a way that would be foreign to the public setting and partly because the shareholders' role is …

The Determinants Of Shareholder Voting On Stock Option Plans, Randall S. Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Over the past decade, executive compensation has become a controversial topic. Increasingly, corporate boards of directors are confronted by angry shareholder groups over the size and composition of executive pay packages. One of the most important focal points for these tensions arises when shareholders are asked by the board to approve the creation of new stock option plans, or the amendment of existing plans. This article seeks to identify the factors that lead shareholders to support or oppose stock option plans. We examine the justifications for the widespread use of stock options and identify several benefits from stock option plans …