Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Law And Practice Of Shareholder Inspection Rights: A Comparative Analysis Of China And The United States, Randall S. Thomas, Robin Hui Huang
The Law And Practice Of Shareholder Inspection Rights: A Comparative Analysis Of China And The United States, Randall S. Thomas, Robin Hui Huang
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Shareholder inspection rights allow a shareholder to access the relevant documents of the company in which they hold an interest, so as to address the problem of information asymmetry and reduce the agency costs inherent in the corporate structure. While Chinese corporate governance and American corporate governance face different sets of agency cost problems, this Article shows that shareholder inspection rights play an important role in both China and the United States. On the books, while shareholder inspection rights in both countries are broadly similar, there are some important differences on issues such as the proper purpose requirement. The empirical …
Cutting Class Action Agency Costs: Lessons From The Public Company, Amanda M. Rose
Cutting Class Action Agency Costs: Lessons From The Public Company, Amanda M. Rose
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The agency relationship between class counsel and class members in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions is similar to that between executives and shareholders in U.S. public companies. This similarity has often been noted in class action literature, but until this Article no attempt has been made to systematically compare the approaches taken in these two settings to reduce agency costs. Class action scholars have downplayed the importance of the public company analogy because public companies are subject to market discipline and class actions are not. But this is precisely why the analogy is useful: because public companies are subject to market …