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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Rise And (Potential) Fall Of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, Vivek Ghosal, D. Daniel Sokol
The Rise And (Potential) Fall Of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, Vivek Ghosal, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
Government enforcement against collusion, now viewed by the Supreme Court as the “supreme evil” in antitrust, has gone through various phases of enforcement in the United States. There have been periods in which cartels have been able to collude more or less effectively given various institutional tools at the disposal of the government. By analyzing enforcement and prosecutions data over a long time horizon, 1969–2016, this Article examines the attributes of cartel enforcement over time and the changing use of tools to assist with detection and punishment. We provide a comprehensive description of critical cartel enforcement events and institutional developments …
Direct Evidence Of A Sherman Act Agreement, William H. Page
Direct Evidence Of A Sherman Act Agreement, William H. Page
UF Law Faculty Publications
In cases that allege price fixing or other per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, courts usually begin their opinions by saying there is no direct evidence of agreement—evidence like a “recorded phone call” that is “explicit and requires no inferences to establish” that the necessary direct communications occurred. Only at that point do the courts turn to the sufficiency of the inferences of agreement from circumstantial evidence. Courts highlight the absence of direct evidence of agreement in this way because of its special role on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, when courts do not …
Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, D. Daniel Sokol
Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
Contemporary rhetoric surrounding antitrust in an age of populism has potential implications with regard to criminal antitrust enforcement. In areas such as resale price maintenance, monopolization, and Robinson-Patman violations, antitrust criminalization remains the law on the books. Antitrust populists and traditional antitrust thinkers who embrace a singular economic goal of antitrust push to enforce antitrust law that is already “on the books.” A natural extension of enforcement by the antitrust populists would be to advocate the use of criminal sanctions, outside of collusion, for various antitrust violations which are “on the books” but have not been used in over a …
The Messenger Model: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?, Jeffrey L. Harrison
The Messenger Model: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
This article makes the case that the messenger model is either tacitly or inadvertently a "don't ask, don't tell" policy when it comes to competitor cooperation. In addition, this article presents an economic framework that explains how such a policy may benefit health care consumers. Finally, it is suggested that the "don't ask, don't tell" policy has created an area of per se legality that precludes an examination designed to distinguish consumer-benefiting practices from those that provide no benefit.