Law Commons^™

Repeat Players In Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Margaret S. Williams

Scholarly Works

As class certification wanes, plaintiffs’ lawyers resolve hundreds of thousands of individual lawsuits through aggregate settlements in multidistrict litigation. But without class actions, formal rules are scarce and judges rarely scrutinize the private agreements that result. Meanwhile, the same principal-agent concerns that plagued class-action attorneys linger. These circumstances are ripe for exploitation: few rules, little oversight, multi-million dollar common-benefit fees, and a push for settlement can tempt a cadre of repeat players to fill in the gaps in ways that further their own self-interest.

Although multidistrict litigation now comprises 36 percent of the entire federal civil caseload, legal scholars have …

Disaggregating, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

Commonality is a defining characteristic of mass-tort litigation. But mass-tort claimants typically do not share enough in common to warrant class certification. That is, commonality does not predominate. Yet, without class certification, judges cannot conclude these cases as a unit absent a private settlement.

This paradox prompts two questions. First, what level of commonality justifies aggregating mass torts, shorn of Rule 23’s procedural protections? And, second, should the federal judicial system continue to centralize claims with nominal commonality when judges typically cannot resolve them collectively absent a private settlement? This Article’s title suggests one answer: if minimal commonality continues to …

Financiers As Monitors In Aggregate Litigation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

This Article identifies a market-based solution for monitoring large-scale litigation proceeding outside of Rule 23’s safeguards. Although class actions dominate the scholarly discussion of mass litigation, the ever increasing restrictions on certifying a class mean that plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely rely on aggregate, multidistrict litigation to seek redress for group-wide harms. Despite sharing key features with its class action counterpart—such as attenuated attorney-client relationships, attorneyclient conflicts of interest, and high agency costs—no monitor exists in aggregate litigation. Informal group litigation not only lacks Rule 23’s judicial protections against attorney overreaching and self-dealing, but plaintiff’s themselves cannot adequately supervise their attorneys’ behavior. …

Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

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Adequate representation in securities class actions is, at best, an afterthought and, at worst, usurped and subsumed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s lead-plaintiff appointment process. Once appointed, the lead plaintiff bears a crushing burden: Congress expects her to monitor the attorney, thwart strike suits, and deter fraud, while judges expect her appointment as the “most adequate plaintiff” to resolve intra-class conflicts and adequate-representation problems. But even if she could be all things to all people, the lead plaintiff has little authority to do much aside from appointing lead counsel. Plus, class members in securities-fraud cases have diverse preferences …

Introduction: Dukes V. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

This short introduction to Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. aims to explain the case and to set the table for what promises to be thought-provoking roundtable discussion hosted by Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc. Accordingly, what follows is a concise overview of the legal background and current debate over the two procedural issues that the Ninth Circuit explored in detail – how to evaluate Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality when common questions heavily implicate the case’s merits, and when a Rule 23(b)(2) class can include relief apart from injunctive or declaratory relief without endangering due process.

Procedural Adequacy, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

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This short piece responds to Jay Tidmarsh’s article, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 Texas Law Review 1137 (2009). I explore Professor Tidmarsh’s proposed “do no harm” approach to adequate representation in class actions from a procedural legitimacy perspective. I begin by considering the assumption underlying his alternative, namely that in any given class action both attorneys and class representatives tend to act as self-interested homo economicus and we must therefore tailor the adequacy requirement to curb self-interest only in so far as it makes class members worse off than they would be with individual litigation. Adopting the “do no harm” …

Cafa's Impact On Litigation As A Public Good, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

Class actions regulate when government fails. Perhaps this use as an ex post remedy when ex ante regulation founders explains the fervor and rhetoric surrounding Rule 23's political life. In truth, the class action does more than aggregate; it augments government policing and generates external societal benefits. These societal benefits - externalities - are the spillover effects from facilitating small claims litigation. In federalizing class actions through the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Congress, in some ways, impeded class action practice, thereby negating its positive externalities and inhibiting backdoor regulation. This Article critically considers those effects on the common good. …

Class Actions And Limited Vision: Opportunities For Improvement Through A More Functional Approach To Class Treatment Of Disputes, Jeffrey W. Stempel

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This Article describes the evolution of the perception of the modern class action from populist darling to greedy lawyer pariah, including recent passage of CAFA. It then examines the degree to which different types of cases present different potential benefits and detriments of class action treatment and explains why investor class actions, including those brought by institutional investors, are particularly likely to benefit from class treatment, are resistant to many of the perceived problems of class actions in other contexts, and should receive a warmer welcome from courts, both in absolute terms and relative to other types of class actions. …

Between 'Merit Inquiry' And 'Rigorous Analysis': Using Daubert To Navigate The Gray Areas Of Federal Class Action Certification, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

In recent years, the class action certification hearing has become the latest forum for disputes over the reliability of expert testimony. Since these hearings may involve complex technical matters, litigants frequently try to introduce expert testimony to either establish or challenge the basic requirements for class certification. Yet, most courts do not conduct a Daubert analysis before admitting expert testimony during certification, evaluate the evidence according to a uniform standard, or adequately weigh opposing expert opinions.

Even though the Federal Rules of Evidence codify procedures to ensure the reliability of expert testimony, courts have been reluctant to employ them during …