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Full-Text Articles in Law
Cinderella Sovereignty, Anna Gelpern
Cinderella Sovereignty, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati propose an insightful and thought-provoking critique of the barriers to secession under public international law. The critique an important contribution in its own right. I wish it had not been eclipsed by the authors’ clever and provocative fix: turning sovereignty into a tradable commodity. I suspect that this fix would bring about more suffering than the status quo for two reasons. First, a market for sovereign control is unlikely to be a market in any meaningful sense. Therefore, trading sovereignty would not discipline oppressors. Second, should something like a real market materialize, it could diminish …
The Importance Of Being Standard, Anna Gelpern
The Importance Of Being Standard, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Contract standardisation in the sovereign debt market saves time and money in preparing documents and endows widely-used terms with a shared public meaning, which in turn saves investors the costs of acquiring information, facilitates secondary market trading and reduces the scope for mistakes in the judicial interpretation of contract terms. Sovereign debt issuers and investors claim to value standardisation and list it as an important contractual objective. Issuers generally insist that their bond contracts are standard and reflect market practice. Variations from past practice and market norm must be explained in disclosure documents and through market outreach. Standardisation is not …
The Puzzle Of Pdvsa Bond Prices, Anna Gelpern, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati
The Puzzle Of Pdvsa Bond Prices, Anna Gelpern, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Market reports in the summer of 2016 suggest that Venezuela is on the brink of default on upwards of $65 billion in debt. That debt comprises of bonds issued directly by the sovereign and those issued by the state-owned oil company PDVSA. Based on the bond contracts and other legal factors, it is not clear which of these two categories of bonds would fare better in the event of a restructuring. However, market observers are convinced — and we agree — that legal and contractual differences would likely impact the payouts on the bonds if Venezuela defaults. Using a comparison …
Courts And Sovereigns In The Pari Passu Goldmines, Anna Gelpern
Courts And Sovereigns In The Pari Passu Goldmines, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
U.S. federal court rulings against Argentina since 2012 have turned the pari passu clause in sovereign bond contracts into the most promising debt collection tool against immune governments since the days of gunboat diplomacy. The large literature on pari passu (“equal step” in Latin) assumes that the clause had not been used for enforcement before the late 1990s, and that it was first construed by a Belgian court in a case against Peru in the year 2000. The Belgian decision was criticized for wrongly concluding that pari passu promised ratable payment to all holders of Peru’s external debt. A decade …
Russia’S Contract Arbitrage, Anna Gelpern
Russia’S Contract Arbitrage, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Ukraine is poised to restructure its debt, but Russia may hold the best cards in the negotiation. Russia bought $3 billion in Ukrainian Eurobonds in late 2013 to prop up a political ally, since-deposed. As Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has pointed out, these bonds have unique terms that let Russia call for early repayment, putting it ahead of Ukraine’s private creditors. Meanwhile, Russia and its proxies hold enough bonds to block a restructuring vote or hold out, sticking more losses on other creditors. Russia has refused to restructure the bonds in the Paris Club of government-to-government creditors, claiming that …
Injunctions In Sovereign Debt Litigation, Mark C. Weidemaier, Anna Gelpern
Injunctions In Sovereign Debt Litigation, Mark C. Weidemaier, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Injunctions against foreign sovereigns have come under criticism on comity and enforcement grounds. We argue that these objections are overstated. Comity considerations are important but not dispositive. Enforcement objections assign too much significance to the court’s inability to impose meaningful contempt sanctions, overlooking the fact that, when a foreign sovereign is involved, both money judgments and injunctions are enforced through what amounts to a court-imposed embargo. This embargo discourages third parties from dealing with the sovereign and, if sufficiently costly, can induce the sovereign to comply. Nevertheless, we are skeptical about injunctions in sovereign debt litigation. They are prone to …
A Skeptic’S Case For Sovereign Bankruptcy, Anna Gelpern
A Skeptic’S Case For Sovereign Bankruptcy, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This essay describes fundamental flaws in the sovereign debt restructuring regime, but questions the prevailing arguments for sovereign bankruptcy. The author concludes that efficient debt outcomes may well come about without bankruptcy, but that a statutory regime is necessary to achieve sovereign autonomy and political legitimacy.
Banks And Governments: An Arial View, Anna Gelpern
Banks And Governments: An Arial View, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Financial systems and public treasuries are communicating vessels: strength or weakness in one flows to the other, and back. This chapter considers the implications of this insight using case studies from Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The connection is not unique to Europe, although it does not always result in feedback effects, or the ‘doom loop’ that has made headlines since 2010. Events now known as banking or government debt crises often have had elements of both, and could have gone either way. Policy and political choices determined their path. In all cases, governments were as indispensable for resolving banking …
Contract Hope And Sovereign Redemption, Anna Gelpern
Contract Hope And Sovereign Redemption, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Sovereign immunity has served as a partial substitute for bankruptcy protection, but it has encouraged a minority of creditors to pursue unorthodox legal remedies with spillover effects far beyond the debtor-creditor relationship. The attempt to enforce Argentina’s pari passu clause in New York is an example of such a remedy, which relies primarily on collateral damage to other creditors and market infrastructure to obtain settlement from a debtor that would not pay. The District Court decision, now on appeal before the Second Circuit, may not make holding out more attractive in future restructurings – but it would make participation less …
The Wonder-Clause, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati
The Wonder-Clause, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The Greek debt crisis prompted EU officials to embark on a radical reconstruction of the European sovereign debt markets. Prominently featured in this reconstruction was a set of contract provisions called Collective Action Clauses, or CACs. CACs are supposed to help governments and private creditors to renegotiate unsustainable debt contracts, and obviate the need for EU bailouts. But European sovereign debt contacts were already amenable to restructuring; adding CACs could make it harder. Why, then, promote CACs at all, and cast them in such a central role in the market reform initiative? Using interviews with participants in the initiative and …
Hard, Soft, And Embedded: Implementing Principles On Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending And Borrowing, Anna Gelpern
Hard, Soft, And Embedded: Implementing Principles On Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending And Borrowing, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This paper, prepared for UNCTAD’s initiative on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing, considers concrete strategies for implementing the Principles. It draws on studies in soft law and new governance, and on the recent experience in promoting best practices in international finance, including project finance, extraction revenue management, foreign aid, sovereign investment, and sovereign borrowing in the capital markets. It recommends maintaining the current non-binding character of the Principles, while embedding implementation in multi-stakeholder arrangements for ongoing disclosure, assessment, interpretation, and adaptation. This strategy has the best chance of changing behavior in sovereign lending and borrowing by creating constituencies for implementation …
Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem Of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, Anna Gelpern
Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem Of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This Feature considers the debts of quasi-sovereign states in light of proposals to let them file for bankruptcy protection. States that have ceded some but not all sovereign prerogatives to a central government face distinct challenges as debtors. It is unhelpful to analyze these challenges mainly through the bankruptcy lens. State bankruptcy posits an institutional fix for a problem that remains theoretically undefined and empirically contested. I suggest a way of mapping the problem that does not work back from a solution. I highlight the implications of sovereign immunity, immortality, concurrent authority, macroeconomic policy, and democratic accountability for quasi-sovereign debt …
Domestic Bonds, Credit Derivatives, And The Next Transformation Of Sovereign Debt, Anna Gelpern
Domestic Bonds, Credit Derivatives, And The Next Transformation Of Sovereign Debt, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Not long ago, financial markets in most poor and middle-income countries were shallow to nonexistent, and closed to foreigners. Governments often had to rely on risky borrowing abroad; the private sector had even fewer options. But between 1995 and 2005, domestic debt in the emerging markets grew from $1 trillion to $4 trillion. In Mexico, domestic debt went from just over 20% of the total government debt stock in 1995 to nearly 80% in 2007. Foreign and local investors are buying. Over the same period, derivative contracts to transfer emerging market credit risk surpassed the market capitalization of the benchmark …
Odious, Not Debt, Anna Gelpern
Odious, Not Debt, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article argues that the doctrine of Odious Debt, which has enjoyed a revival since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, frames the problem of odious debt in a way that excludes most of the problematic obligations incurred by twentieth-century despots. Advocacy and academic literature traditionally describe the odious debt problem as one of government contracts with private creditors. Most theories of sovereign debt key off the same relationship. But in the latest crop of cases, including Iraq, Liberia, and Nigeria, private creditors represent a small fraction of the old regime's debts. Most of the creditors are other governments …
Building A Better Seating Chart For Sovereign Restructurings, Anna Gelpern
Building A Better Seating Chart For Sovereign Restructurings, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Every sovereign debt restructuring in recent memory has wrestled with the problem of inter-creditor equity. Governments have discriminated among creditors in ways that were hard to predict and often were not revealed until after a debt default. In contrast, debts of firms, individuals and even localities are ranked in order of priority established by contract and statute. This ranking is known at borrowing, generally corresponds to the order of repayment in bankruptcy liquidation, and helps define the creditors' relative bargaining power in reorganization. Without a bankruptcy backstop, most debts of national governments are legally equal. Yet in practice, sovereign immunity …
Domestic And External Debt: The Doomed Quest For Equal Treatment, Anna Gelpern, Brad Setser
Domestic And External Debt: The Doomed Quest For Equal Treatment, Anna Gelpern, Brad Setser
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Until recently, governments borrowed from domestic residents and foreign investors using very different instruments. Residents bought "domestic debt" - paper denominated in local currency and governed by domestic law. Foreign investors preferred "external debt", which offered foreign currency and foreign law. Because there was virtually no overlap between resident and nonresident holdings, it mattered little that lawyers and economists defined domestic and external debt differently: lawyers focused on features such as governing law and jurisdiction, economists on the holder's residence and currency of denomination. The legal and economic definitions of domestic and external debt were effectively bundled: "domestic debt" meant …