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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Evolving International Judiciary, Karen J. Alter Jan 2011

The Evolving International Judiciary, Karen J. Alter

Faculty Working Papers

This article explains the rapid proliferation in international courts first in the post WWII and then the post Cold War era. It examines the larger international judicial complex, showing how developments in one region and domain affect developments in similar and distant regimes. Situating individual developments into their larger context, and showing how change occurs incrementally and slowly over time, allows one to see developments in economic, human rights and war crimes systems as part of a longer term evolutionary process of the creation of international judicial authority. Evolution is not the same as teleology; we see that some international …


The Global Spread Of European Style International Courts, Karen J. Alter Jan 2011

The Global Spread Of European Style International Courts, Karen J. Alter

Faculty Working Papers

Europe created the model of embedded international courts (IC), where domestic judges work with international judges to interpret and apply international legal rules that are also part of national legal orders. This model has now diffused around the world. This article documents the spread of European-style ICs: there are now eleven operational copies of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), three copies of the European Court of Human Rights, and a handful of additional ICs that use Europe's embedded approach to international law. After documenting the spread of European-style ICs, the article then explains how two regions chose European style …


The Relation Of Theories Of Jurisprudence To International Politics And Law, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2011

The Relation Of Theories Of Jurisprudence To International Politics And Law, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

In this essay we shall be concerned with the real world relevance of theories of international law; that is, with the question of the theories themselves as a factor in international decision-making. To do this it is first necessary to review briefly the substance of the jurisprudential debate among legal scholars, then to view some basic jurisprudential ideas as factors in international views of "law," and finally to reach the question of the operative difference a study of these theories might make in world politics.


New Approaches To Customary International Law, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2011

New Approaches To Customary International Law, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

Reviews Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism; Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works; Brian A. Lepard, Customary International Law.

After a century of benign neglect, international theorizing has taken off. The three contributors to legal theory reviewed here can be placed along a linear spectrum with Posner at the extreme political science end, Lepard at the opposite international law end and Andrew Guzman holding up the middle.


Non-State Actors From The Perspective Of The Policy-Oriented School: Power, Law, Actors And The View From New Haven, Anthony A. D'Amato Jan 2011

Non-State Actors From The Perspective Of The Policy-Oriented School: Power, Law, Actors And The View From New Haven, Anthony A. D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

Law needs Power for enforcement of its rules; Power utilizes Law for creating conditions of stability that enhance its salience. Yet when the New Haven school tries to include international law in its power-oriented view of international relations, it ends up with a misleading two-dimensional descriptivism.


Partisan Conflicts Over Presidential Authority, Jide Okechuku Nzelibe Jan 2011

Partisan Conflicts Over Presidential Authority, Jide Okechuku Nzelibe

Faculty Working Papers

A prevailing view in the legal and political science literature assumes that power holders seek to expand or contract their constitutional authority based on incentives that are intrinsic to the logic of the institutional offices they occupy. For instance, it is generally assumed that Presidents are empire builders who will almost always prefer maximum flexibility in shaping their policy objectives, whereas members of Congress may sometimes shirk their institutional prerogatives because of electoral incentives or collective action problems. A similar institutional logic underpins the view that federal courts will often seek to expand their interpretive authority in constitutional controversies at …