Law Commons^™

Liability And Admission Of Wrongdoing In Public Enforcement Of Law, Samuel W. Buell

Faculty Scholarship

Some judges and scholars have questioned the social value of the standard form in which the Securities and Exchange Commission settles its corporate enforcement actions, including the agency’s use of essentially unreviewed consent decrees that include no admission of liability or wrongdoing. This essay for a symposium on SEC enforcement provides an analysis of the deterrent effects of the three main components of settlements in public enforcement of law: liability, admission, and remedy. The conclusions are the following. All three components have beneficial deterrent effects. Cost considerations nonetheless justify some settlements that dispense with liability or admission, or even both. …

Who Can’T Raise Capital? The Scylla And Charybdis Of Capital Formation, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

There has long been complaints that the heavy regulatory hand of Blue Sky Law administrators prevents capital formation by small issuers. Using data recently collected by the SEC, the article reasons that the problems capital starved small issuers encounter is not the state regulator. The problems are elsewhere. The paper explores whether intermediation may ultimately enable more startups to raise needed funds. For this to occur, however, the paper explores the formidable obstacles the broker must overcome in meeting demanding suitability requirements.

Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation And Responsibility Failure, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

In the modern financial architecture, financial services and products increasingly are provided outside of the traditional banking system—and thus without the need for bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds. Most corporate financing, for example, no longer is dependent on bank loans but raised through special-purpose entities, money-market mutual funds, securities lenders, hedge funds, and investment banks. This shift, referred to as “disintermediation” and described as creating a “shadow banking” system, is so radically transforming finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink their assumptions. Two of the fundamental market failures underlying shadow banking—information failure and agency failure—were …

Don’T ‘Screw Joe The Plummer’: The Sausage-Making Of Financial Reform, Kimberly D. Krawiec

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines agency-level activity during the preproposal rulemaking phase—a time period about which little is known despite its importance to policy outcomes—through an analysis of federal agency activity in connection with section 619 of the Dodd–Frank Act, popularly known as the Volcker Rule. By capitalizing on transparency efforts specific to Dodd–Frank, I am able to access information on agency contacts whose disclosure is not required by the Administrative Procedure Act and, therefore, not typically available to researchers.

I analyze the roughly 8,000 public comment letters received by the Financial Stability Oversight Council in advance of its study regarding Volcker …

Strengthening Financial Reporting: An Essay On Expanding The Auditor’S Opinion Letter, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

Users of financial statements, foremost of which are investors, have a voracious appetite for information that better enables them to assess the financial position and performance of the reporting firm. Even though financial statements purport to address their needs, because the statements, which are prepared by the firm’s managers, conceal a range of managerial estimates, assumptions, judgments, and choices, investors are deprived of the most fundamental kernel of information they seek, namely the overall quality of the financial reports themselves. In this Article, the author sets forth several modest steps that would enhance the overall quality of financial reporting by …

Regulating Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Inaugural Address for Boston University Review of Banking & Financial Law's Inaugural Symposium: “Shadow Banking” February 24, 2012.

Although shadow banking is said to be huge, estimated at over $60 trillion, it is not well defined. This short and accessible paper attempts to define shadow banking by identifying its overall scope and its basic characteristics. Based on the definition derived, the paper also conceptually examines how shadow banking can be regulated to try to maximize its efficiencies while minimizing its risks.

The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture Protecting Investors In Securitization Transactions: Does Dodd–Frank Help, Or Hurt?, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Securitization has been called into question because of its role in the recent financial crisis. Schwarcz examines the potential flaws in the securitization process and compare how the Dodd–Frank Act treats them. Although Dodd–Frank addresses one of the flaws, it underregulates or fails to regulate other flaws. It also overregulates by addressing aspects of securitization that are not flawed.

The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting The Dc Circuit’S Usurpation Of Sec Rulemaking Authority, James D. Cox, Benjamin J.C. Baucom

Faculty Scholarship

In The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, Professor James D. Cox of Duke University School of Law & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, recent law clerk to Justice Don R. Willett of the Supreme Court of Texas, argue “that the level of review invoked by the D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable and its earlier decisions is dramatically inconsistent with the standard enacted by Congress.” They conclude “that the D.C. Circuit has assumed for itself a role opposed to the one Congress prescribed for courts reviewing SEC rules.”

Direct And Indirect U.S. Government Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Keynote Address: A Regulatory Framework For Managing Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This accessible analysis of systemic risk regulation was delivered as the keynote speech at an October 20, 2011 European Central Bank conference on regulation of financial services. Many regulatory responses, like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, consist largely of politically motivated reactions to the financial crisis, looking for villains (whether or not they exist). To be most effective, however, the regulation must be situated within a more analytical framework. In this speech, I attempt to build that framework, showing that preventive regulation is insufficient and that regulation also must be designed to limit the transmission of systemic risk …

The Paradoxes Of Dodd-Frank, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Securities Class Actions As Public Law, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market provides a wide-ranging criticism of and thoughtful reforms for securities class actions....However, both their critique of contemporary class actions and their model of the reforms they propose leave unexamined a good many matters relevant to both the criticism and reform of securities class actions....Bratton and Wachter earn high marks for being less passionate and much more thoughtful than others in the chorus calling for reform; indeed, their observations are among the most thoughtful to be found in this area. Nonetheless, their analysis is incomplete in many important areas, and in addition to …

There Are Plaintiffs And … There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Action Settlements, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, Lynn Bai

Faculty Scholarship

In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We thus provide insight into whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia that may explain why some suits settle for extremely small sums - small relative to the "provable losses" suffered by the class, small relative to the asset size of the defendant-company, and small relative to other settlements in our sample. This evidence bears …

Reforming Punishment Of Financial Reporting Fraud, Samuel W. Buell

Faculty Scholarship

Present sentencing law in criminal cases of financial reporting fraud is embarrassingly flawed. The problem is urgent given that courts are now regularly sentencing corporate offenders, sometimes (but sometimes not) to extremely punitive terms of imprisonment. Policing of fraud by multiple jurisdictions in a federal system means that principled sentencing law is necessary not only for first-order policy reasons but also for coordination of sanctioning efforts. Proportionality and rationality demand that sentencing law have an agreed scale for measuring cases of financial reporting fraud in relation to each other, a sound methodology for fixing a given case on that scale, …