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In Defense Of Breakups: Administering A “Radical” Remedy, Rory Van Loo
In Defense Of Breakups: Administering A “Radical” Remedy, Rory Van Loo
Faculty Scholarship
Calls for breaking up monopolies—especially Amazon, Facebook, and Google—have largely focused on proving that past acquisitions of companies like Whole Foods, Instagram, and YouTube were anticompetitive. But scholars have paid insufficient attention to another major obstacle that also explains why the government in recent decades has not broken up a single large company. After establishing that an anticompetitive merger or other act has occurred, there is great skepticism of breakups as a remedy. Judges, scholars, and regulators see a breakup as extreme, frequently comparing the remedy to trying to “unscramble eggs.” They doubt the government’s competence in executing such a …
International Antitrust Cooperation And The Preference For Nonbinding Regimes, Anu Bradford
International Antitrust Cooperation And The Preference For Nonbinding Regimes, Anu Bradford
Faculty Scholarship
Today, multinational corporations operate in increasingly international markets, yet antitrust laws regulating their competitive conduct remain national. Thus, corporations are subject to divergent antitrust regimes across the various jurisdictions in which they operate. This increases transaction costs, causes unnecessary delays, and raises the likelihood of conflicting decisions. The risks inherent in multi-jurisdictional regulatory review were prominently illustrated in the proposed GE/Honeywell acquisition, which failed following the European Union’s (“EU”) decision to prohibit the transaction despite its earlier approval in the United States. Inconsistent remedies imposed on Microsoft following parallel investigations by both the U.S. and EU authorities serve as another …