Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 9 of 9

Full-Text Articles in Law

Injunctive And Reverse Settlements In Competition-Blocking Litigation, Keith N. Hylton, Sungjoon Cho Oct 2013

Injunctive And Reverse Settlements In Competition-Blocking Litigation, Keith N. Hylton, Sungjoon Cho

Faculty Scholarship

We distinguish standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, which prohibit the defendant's activity. The reverse (payment) settlement is a special type of injunctive settlement. We examine the divergence between private and social incentives to settle and policies that would minimize socially undesirable injunctive and reverse settlements (e.g., banning reverse settlements). The results are applied to competition-blocking litigation, such as patent infringement and antidumping.


Self-Regulation Of Insider-Trading In Mutual Funds And Advisers, Tamar Frankel Oct 2013

Self-Regulation Of Insider-Trading In Mutual Funds And Advisers, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Mutual funds are required to impose Codes of Ethics on many of their employees. Did this requirement make a difference? After all, similar Codes proliferate in many other financial and business corporations! 4 with fairly miserable results. In fact, the temptations facing employees and managers of many business corporations that published self-imposed Codes are relatively weaker than the temptations facing employees and managers of mutual funds. Yet as compared to mutual funds, these business companies have failed to prevent insider-trading!

I believe that regulated mutual funds are less prone to insider-trading than non-regulated funds and traders because their Codes of …


Privacy, Antitrust, And Power, Frank Pasquale Jul 2013

Privacy, Antitrust, And Power, Frank Pasquale

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Paradoxes Of Digital Antitrust, Frank A. Pasquale Jul 2013

Paradoxes Of Digital Antitrust, Frank A. Pasquale

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Protection Of Foreign Direct Investments In Developing And Emerging Markets Through The Instrumentality Of Arbitration: Fair Game?, Florence Shu-Acquaye Jan 2013

The Protection Of Foreign Direct Investments In Developing And Emerging Markets Through The Instrumentality Of Arbitration: Fair Game?, Florence Shu-Acquaye

Faculty Scholarship

Investment treaties have tripled in the twenty-first century with over 170 countries signing onto bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Most BITs are made between a developed and a developing country, whereby a host country promises to protect home country's foreign direct investment (FDI) in exchange for the prospect of increased capital in the future. Hence, BITs tend to reduce the expected risks to FDI in that they stabilize a host country's existing investment environment, as well as provide a substitute for weak domestic laws and institutions that are often ill-equipped to protect FDI.


Google And Search-Engine Market Power, Mark R. Patterson Jan 2013

Google And Search-Engine Market Power, Mark R. Patterson

Faculty Scholarship

A significant and growing body of commentary considers whether possible manipulation of search results by Google could give rise to antitrust liability. Surprisingly, though, little serious attention has been paid to whether Google has market power. Those who favor antitrust scrutiny of Google generally cite its large market share, from which they infer or assume its dominance. Those who are skeptical of competition law’s role in regulating search, on the other hand, usually cite Google’s 'competition is only a click away' mantra to suggest that Google’s market position is precarious. In fact, the issue of Google’s power is more complicated …


Saving The First Amendment From Itself: Relief From The Sherman Act Against The Rabbinic Cartels, Barak D. Richman Jan 2013

Saving The First Amendment From Itself: Relief From The Sherman Act Against The Rabbinic Cartels, Barak D. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

America’s rabbis currently structure their employment market with rules that flagrantly violate the Sherman Act. The consequences of these rules, in addition to the predictable economic outcomes of inflated wages for rabbis and restricted consumer freedoms for the congregations that employ them, meaningfully hinder Jewish communities from seeking their preferred spiritual leader. Although the First Amendment cannot combat against this privately-orchestrated (yet paradigmatic) restriction on religious expression, the Sherman Act can. Ironically, however, the rabbinic organizations implementing the restrictive policies claim that the First Amendment immunizes them from Sherman Act scrutiny, thereby claiming the First Amendment empowers them to do …


Young Again, Larry Yackle Jan 2013

Young Again, Larry Yackle

Faculty Scholarship

This essay revisits an old problem in the law of federal courts: the source of the right of action in Ex parte Young. The core of the story underlying Young is familiar. Shareholders in railroad corporations filed suit in a federal circuit court, claiming that state established rail rates in Minnesota violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the (dormant) Commerce Clause. The circuit court issued a preliminary injunction barring adoption of the rates and prohibiting the defendants from attempting to enforce them. One of the defendants, Minnesota Attorney General Edward T. Young, nonetheless brought a state court mandamus action against the …


A Competition Act By India, For India: The First Three Years Of Enforcement Under The New Competition Act, Dorothy S. Lund Jan 2013

A Competition Act By India, For India: The First Three Years Of Enforcement Under The New Competition Act, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

In 2002, India unveiled its new Competition Act. The Act substantially improves upon the previous competition regime, which regulated and condemned dominance even absent culpable conduct. Despite improvements, provisions of the Act have proven difficult for the fledgling Competition Commission (“the Commission”) to implement. For one, the Act overwhelmingly prefers rule of reason analysis to per se illegality for horizontal and vertical agreements. While this approach gives the Commission the flexibility to conduct a nuanced inquiry, the economic analysis required is challenging. So far, the Commission has struggled when applying basic antitrust economics in the hundred or so orders that …