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Series

Faculty Scholarship

2010

Duke Law

Administrative Law

Independent regulatory commissions

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Climate Change, Dead Zones, And Massive Problems In The Administrative State: A Guide For Whittling Away, James Salzman, J.B. Ruhl Jan 2010

Climate Change, Dead Zones, And Massive Problems In The Administrative State: A Guide For Whittling Away, James Salzman, J.B. Ruhl

Faculty Scholarship

Mandates that agencies solve massive problems such as sprawl and climate change roll easily out of the halls of legislatures, but as a practical matter what can any one agency do about them? Serious policy challenges such as these have dimensions far beyond the capacity of any single agency to manage effectively. Rather, as the Supreme Court recently observed in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell swoop, but instead whittle away over time, refining their approach as circumstances change and they develop a more nuanced understanding of how best …


The Consequences Of Congress’S Choice Of Delegate: Judicial And Agency Interpretations Of Title Vii, Margaret H. Lemos Jan 2010

The Consequences Of Congress’S Choice Of Delegate: Judicial And Agency Interpretations Of Title Vii, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

Although Congress delegates lawmaking authority to both courts and agencies, we know remarkably little about the determinants-and even less about the consequences-of the choice between judicial and administrative process. The few scholars who have sought to understand the choice of delegate have used formal modeling to illuminate various aspects of the decision from the perspective of the enacting Congress. That approach yields useful insight into the likely preferences of rational legislators, but tells us nothing about how (or whether) those preferences play out in the behavior of courts and agencies. Without such knowledge, we have no way of testing the …