Law Commons^™

Truth In Savings And The Failure Of Legislative Methodology, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

The federal Truth in Savings Act (Truth in Savings) provides one example of failed legislative problem solving. On its face, Truth in Savings is a congressional attempt to solve constituents' problems. The statute, however, appears unlikely to resolve the issues presented to Congress and may even create new and unintended problems that will make matters worse. Truth in Savings, like many other legislative efforts, fails adequately to address constituents' problems because the methodology employed by legislative drafters suffers from a fundamental flaw - it has no built-in mechanism to define rigorously the problem being addressed. Without first identifying the problem, …

Administrative And Judicial Review Of Prompt Corrective Action Decisions By The Federal Banking Regulators, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Pros And Cons Of A Self-Regulatory Organization For Advisers And Mutual Funds, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Congress is seriously considering bills to establish self-regulatory organizations (SROs) for investment advisers (advisers) and investment companies (Funds). These bills would require members of the investment management industry to regulate themselves under the watchful eye of the Securities and Exchange Commission, similar in approach to the regulation of broker-dealers by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and the securities exchanges. Proposals to establish SRO for investment advisers have arisen before. However, those proposals did not cover Funds and their advisers,

The Politics Of Article 9, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

In the ongoing debate concerning the efficiency and social value of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, two points are beyond dispute. First, asset-based financing has undergone an enormous transformation since the enactment of Article 9. The most vivid illustration of this is the dramatic increase in the number and size of firms that rely on secured credit as their principal means of financing both ongoing operations and growth opportunities. Previously, with a few exceptions (such as factoring and trust receipts), secured financing principally had served second-class markets as the "poor man's" means of obtaining credit. Now, it has …

Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, John C. Coffee Jr., Bernard S. Black

Faculty Scholarship

A central puzzle in understanding the governance of large American public firms is why most institutional shareholders are passive. Why would they rather sell than fight? Until recently, the Berle-Means paradigm – the belief that separation of ownership and control naturally characterizes the modern corporation – reigned supreme. Shareholder passivity was seen as an inevitable result of the scale of modern industrial enterprise and of the collective action problems that face shareholders, each of whom owns only a small fraction of a large firm's shares.

A paradigm shift may be in the making, however. Rival hypotheses have recently been offered …