Law Commons^™

Wto Dispute Settlement: Can We Go Back Again?, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

The world's twenty-year experiment with a rule-based international trading order is most likely ending. Trade wars are raging again for the first time in two decades as World Trade Organization (WTO) members unilaterally impose and counterimpose sanctions. In Geneva, the WTO Appellate Body, whose existence is essential to the functioning of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), is on a trajectory to shut down in December 2020. For all the fireworks, however, many commentators retain an optimism that the recent events will be a passing phase and that the world will return to a more law-oriented trading system after the …

Us-Cool Retaliation: The Wto’S Article 22.6 Arbitration, Chad P. Bown, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the World Trade Organization’s Article 22.6 arbitration report on the dispute over the United States’ country of origin labeling (US–COOL) regulation for meat products. At prior phases of the legal process, a WTO Panel and the Appellate Body had sided with Canada and Mexico by finding that the US regulation had negatively affected their exports of livestock – cattle and hogs – to the US market. The arbitrators authorized Canada and Mexico to retaliate by over $1 billion against US exports – the second largest authorized retaliation on record and only the twelfth WTO dispute to reach …

Trade In Environmental Goods: A Review Of The Wto Appellate Body’S Ruling In Us — Countervailing Measures (China), Rachel Brewster, Claire Brunel, Anna Maria Mayda

Faculty Scholarship

In this paper we claim that, in the WTO Appellate Body (AB)’s ruling in US-Countervailing Measures (China), the AB decision has essentially left unchanged the practice of imposing countervailing duties (CVDs) on environmental goods. While the US has formally “lost” the case, a change in the procedures and tests used to motivate the CVD will allow the US to continue using this policy tool. From an economic point of view, this is not welcome news since CVDs have the standard distortionary effects of tariffs and could go against environmental goals. From a political-economy point of view, the CVDs in this …

Supplying Compliance: Why And When The United States Complies With Wto Rulings, Rachel Brewster, Adam Chilton

Faculty Scholarship

In studies of compliance with international law, the focus is usually on the “demand side” – that is, how to increase the pressure on the state to comply. Less attention has been paid, however, to the consequences of the “supply side” – who within the state is responsible for the compliance. This Article is the first study to systematically address the issue of how different actors within the United States government alter national policy in response to the violations of international law. The Article does so by examining cases initiated under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). …

The Next Generation Of Trade And Environment Conflicts: The Rise Of Green Industrial Policy, Mark Wu, James Salzman

Faculty Scholarship

A major shift is transforming the trade and environment field, triggered by governments’ rising use of industrial policies to spark nascent renewable energy industries and to restrict exports of certain minerals in the face of political economy constraints. While economically distorting, these policies do produce significant economic and environmental benefits. At the same time, they often violate World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, leading to increasingly harsh conflicts between trading partners.

This Article presents a comprehensive analysis of these emerging conflicts, arguing that they represent a sharp break from past trade and environment disputes. It examines the causes of the shift …

Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional wisdom in international law is that dispute resolution institutions sharpen the reputational costs to states. This article challenges this understanding by examining how the inclusion of dispute resolution tribunals and remedy regimes can alter reputational analysis by shifting the audience¹s understanding of how mandatory a treaty's substantive obligations are. Drawing on the distinction between prices and sanctions, this article contests the assumption that the introduction of a remedy regime in international agreements will regularly increase compliance with the treaty¹s substantive terms. Instead, some remedy regimes may 'price' deviations from the treaty¹s terms and thereby facilitate breaches of the …

The Surprising Benefits To Developing Countries Of Linking International Trade And Intellectual Property, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

The World Trade Organization's Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement is controversial, requiring WTO members to establish a host of domestic institutions to support intellectual property rights, including substantive laws creating rights and a host of enforcement procedures. Trade scholars and development advocates frequently criticize the agreement as economically harmful to developing countries. This Article does not argue that the TRIPS Agreement is beneficial for developing states, but highlights how the agreement has produced some surprising benefits over the last decade and a half. First, the TRIPS Agreement's requirement that developing states make the domestic enforcement of intellectual property rules …

The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, And Trade Law Enforcement, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

One of the major innovations of the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) is the regulation of sanctions in response to violations of trade law. The DSU requires governments to receive multilateral approval before suspending trade concessions and limits the extent of retaliation to prospective damages. In addition, the DSU permits governments to impose only conditional sanctions: sanctions for violations that continue after the dispute resolution process is complete. This enforcement regime creates a remedy gap: governments cannot respond, even to obvious breaches, until the end of the dispute resolution process (and then only to the extent of …

Human Rights And Intellectual Property: Mapping The Global Interface, Laurence R. Helfer, Graeme W. Austin

Faculty Scholarship

Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Global Interface explores the intersections between intellectual property and human rights law and policy. The relationship between these two fields has captured the attention of governments, policymakers, and activist communities in a diverse array of international and domestic political and judicial venues. These actors often raise human rights arguments as counterweights to the expansion of intellectual property in areas including freedom of expression, public health, education, privacy, agriculture, and the rights of indigenous peoples. At the same time, the creators and owners of intellectual property are asserting a human rights justification for the …

Shadow Unilateralism: Enforcing International Trade Law At The Wto, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

This short essay briefly traces the evolution of trade law enforcement from the the GATT to the WTO regime. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is widely viewed as a major innovation from the GATT regime in that it subordinates unilateral enforcement of trade law to a rule-based system of multilateral enforcement. I recognize the successes of the WTO regime but the institution effective permits (if not encourages) the unilateral enforcement of trade law outside of the DSU framework Specifically, I examine how the DSU system only provides a prospective remedy - that is, the DSU permits retaliation only for …

Maximum Carbon Intensity Limitations And The Agreement On Technical Barriers To Trade, Charles O. Verrill Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Emission of greenhouse gases is a global problem. Any nation seeking to restrict such emissions by its manufacturers should avoid putting them at a disadvantage in world and domestic markets where they are likely to compete with producers that do not bear the cost of emission controls. One approach being considered in the United States would be adoption of technical regulations limiting the carbon intensity of basic products, such as cement, aluminum, steel, etc., offered for sale in the US market (carbon intensity would be defined as the C02 equivalent emissions per ton of product). Domestic and imported products that …

Rule-Based Dispute Resolution In International Trade Law, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

Why does the United States ever prefer to settle disputes under a system of rules rather than a system of negotiations? Powerful states are advantaged by negotiation-based approaches to settling disagreements because they have the resources to resolve individual disputes on favorable terms. By contrast, rule-based dispute resolution advantages weak states as a means to hold powerful states to the terms of their agreements. Then why did the United States want a rule-based system to settle international disputes in the WTO? To answer this question, we have to understand domestic politics as well as international politics. International constraints, particularly international …

The Domestic Origins Of International Agreements, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines how international agreements are substitutes for statutes. The statutory law-making system and international agreement negotiations are separate, but sometimes rival, processes for setting national-level policy. International agreements have several advantages over domestic statutes. Under United States law, international agreements can entrench policies that might otherwise be subject to change; they can transfer agenda-setting power from the Congress to the President; and they can delegate authority to international organizations. Each of these effects can lead domestic interest groups to seek international negotiations rather than domestic legislation. Little difference exists between the politics of international and domestic law: Interest …