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Empirical Methods In Antitrust Litigation: Review And Critique, Jonathan Baker, Daniel Rubinfeld
Empirical Methods In Antitrust Litigation: Review And Critique, Jonathan Baker, Daniel Rubinfeld
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
The use of empirical methods in antitrust has been growing at an exponential rate. It is now commonplace for multiple regression and other statistical methods to be utilized in merger cases, especially those involving predictions of the price increases that may result from the strategic decisions of the merging firms. These methods are also prominently employed in civil nonmerger investigations by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies (including price fixing, monopolization, and exclusive dealing cases) and in private litigation (including damage claims and class action suits). This article surveys the methodologies that have been used and the range of questions that …
Identifying The Firm-Specific Cost Pass-Through Rate, Jonathan Baker, Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, Signe-Mary Mckernan
Identifying The Firm-Specific Cost Pass-Through Rate, Jonathan Baker, Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, Signe-Mary Mckernan
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
A merger that permits the combined company to reduce the marginal cost of producing a product creates an incentive for it to lower price. Accordingly, the rate at which cost changes are passed through to prices (along with an estimate of the magnitude of cost reductions that would result from merger) matters to the evaluation of the likely competitive effects of an acquisition. In this paper, we describe our empirical methodology for estimating the cost pass-through rate facing an individual firm, and for distinguishing that rate from the rate at which a firm passes through cost changes common to all …
The Gains From Merger Or Collusion In Product Differentiated Industries, Jonathan Baker, Timothy Bresnahan
The Gains From Merger Or Collusion In Product Differentiated Industries, Jonathan Baker, Timothy Bresnahan
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
A merger in an industry with differentiated products increases the market power of the merging firms to the extent that their products are close substitutes and that other firms produce only more distant substitutes.' Such a merger makes the residual demand curve of each partner steeper, by shifting each in the direction of the industry demand curve. The extent of this increase in market power depends upon the own-elasticity of demand for each merging firm's product, as well as the cross-elasticity of demand for each with all other firms' products. As a result, evaluating the effect of a merger between …