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Full-Text Articles in Law
Reverse Cross-Listings - The Coming Race To List In Emerging Markets And An Enhanced Understanding Of Classical Bonding, Nicholas C. Howson, Vikramaditya Khanna
Reverse Cross-Listings - The Coming Race To List In Emerging Markets And An Enhanced Understanding Of Classical Bonding, Nicholas C. Howson, Vikramaditya Khanna
Articles
Studies have found that when a U.S. issuer lists abroad on a foreign exchange, its shares exhibit negative abnormal returns. This negative movement may be because the market expects that the foreign listing will facilitate undetectable insider trading on the foreign exchange or other conduct impermissible in the United States.
'Quack Corporate Governance' As Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas C. Howson
Articles
From the start of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “corporatization ” project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Indeed, the Chinese corporate law system has been cannibalized by all - encompassing securities regulation directed at corporate governance, at least for companies with listed stock. This Article traces the path of that sustained intervention and makes a case — wholly contrary to the “quack corporate governance” critique much aired in the United States …
Enforcement Without Foundation? Insider Trading And China's Administrative Law Crisis, Nicholas C. Howson
Enforcement Without Foundation? Insider Trading And China's Administrative Law Crisis, Nicholas C. Howson
Articles
China's securities regulator enforces insider trading prohibitions pursuant to non-legal and non-regulatory internal "guidance." Reported agency decisions indicate that enforcement against insider trading is often possible only pursuant to this guidance, as the behavior identified is far outside of the scope of insider trading liability provided for in statute or regulation. I argue that the agency guidance is itself unlawful and unenforceable, because: (i) the guidance is not the regulatory norm required by the statutory delegation of power; and (ii) the guidance is ultra vires because (a) it addresses something substantively different from what is authorized under the statutory delegation, …