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Erastian And High Church Approaches To The Law: The Jurisprudential Categories Of Robert E. Rodes, Jr., M. Cathleen Kaveny

Journal Articles

It is a great honor for me to have been asked to contribute to this issue of the Journal of Law and Religion focusing on the work of my colleague and friend, Robert E. Rodes, Jr. In June 2006, Professor Rodes celebrated his fiftieth anniversary as a member of the faculty of Notre Dame Law School. His long career has marked him as a founding father of interdisciplinary scholarship at the intersection of faith, law, and morality—the very sort of scholarship which this journal is dedicated to fostering and preserving.

The topics that Professor Rodes has considered over the years …

Sosa, Federal Question Jurisdiction, And Historical Fidelity, Anthony J. Bellia

Journal Articles

In his paper "International Human Rights in American Courts," Judge Fletcher concludes that Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain “has left us with more questions than answers.” Sosa attempted to adapt certain principles belonging to the "general law" to a post-Erie positivistic conception of common law while maintaining fidelity to certain historical expectations. “[I]t would be unreasonable,” the Court thought, “to assume that the First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply because the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism.” The Court was unwilling, however, out …

Grounds Of Law And Legal Theory: A Response, John M. Finnis

Journal Articles

Linking theses of Plato, Wittgenstein and Weber, section I argues that identification of central cases and settling of focal meanings depend upon the theorist's purpose(s) and, in the case of theory about human affairs - theory adequately attentive to the four irreducible orders in which human persons live and act - upon the purposes for which we intelligibly and intelligently act. Among these purposes, primacy (centrality) is to be accorded (by acknowledgement, not fiat) to purposes which are, as best the theorist can judge, reasonable and fit to be adopted by anyone, the theorist included. Section II defends the reasonableness …

On Hart's Ways: Law As Reason And As Fact, John M. Finnis

Journal Articles

This address at the Hart Centenary Conference in Cambridge in July 2007 reflects on foundational elements in Hart's method in legal philosophy. It argues that his understanding of what it is to adopt an internal point of view was flawed by (a) inattention to the difference between descriptive history (or biography or detection) and descriptive general theory of human affairs, (b) inattention to practical reason as argument from premises, some factual but others normative (evaluative) in their content, and (c) relative inattention to the deliberations of law-makers as distinct from subjects of the law. These flaws contributed to a concept …

The Gift Of Milner Ball, Thomas L. Shaffer

Journal Articles

My friend and teacher Milner Ball speaks of the law as "systemic injustice." I find that a bit harsh and tend instead toward a way of looking at injustice that comes from the equally melancholy reflections of Robert E. Rodes, Jr., also my friend—my colleague, too—and also my teacher (in two senses, including the I-once-paid-tuition sense). Bob Rodes has noticed injustice as much as Milner has, but Bob, who tends to be an Erastian, would say it is not the law that is the source of injustice; it is not even the "system"; it is lawyers who are the source …