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Administrative Law

Independent regulatory commissions

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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Impact Of Income Disparity On Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2014

The Impact Of Income Disparity On Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Responding To Agency Avoidance Of Oira, Nina A. Mendelson, Jonathan B. Wiener Jan 2014

Responding To Agency Avoidance Of Oira, Nina A. Mendelson, Jonathan B. Wiener

Faculty Scholarship

Concerns have recently been raised that US federal agencies may sometimes avoid regulatory review by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In this article, we assess the seriousness of such potential avoidance, and we recommend a framework for evaluating potential responses. After summarizing the system of presidential regulatory oversight through OIRA review, we analyze the incentives for agencies to cooperate with or avoid OIRA. We identify a wider array of agency avoidance tactics than has past scholarship, and a wider array of corresponding response options available to OIRA, the President, Congress, and the courts. We argue …


Climate Change, Dead Zones, And Massive Problems In The Administrative State: A Guide For Whittling Away, James Salzman, J.B. Ruhl Jan 2010

Climate Change, Dead Zones, And Massive Problems In The Administrative State: A Guide For Whittling Away, James Salzman, J.B. Ruhl

Faculty Scholarship

Mandates that agencies solve massive problems such as sprawl and climate change roll easily out of the halls of legislatures, but as a practical matter what can any one agency do about them? Serious policy challenges such as these have dimensions far beyond the capacity of any single agency to manage effectively. Rather, as the Supreme Court recently observed in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell swoop, but instead whittle away over time, refining their approach as circumstances change and they develop a more nuanced understanding of how best …


The Consequences Of Congress’S Choice Of Delegate: Judicial And Agency Interpretations Of Title Vii, Margaret H. Lemos Jan 2010

The Consequences Of Congress’S Choice Of Delegate: Judicial And Agency Interpretations Of Title Vii, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

Although Congress delegates lawmaking authority to both courts and agencies, we know remarkably little about the determinants-and even less about the consequences-of the choice between judicial and administrative process. The few scholars who have sought to understand the choice of delegate have used formal modeling to illuminate various aspects of the decision from the perspective of the enacting Congress. That approach yields useful insight into the likely preferences of rational legislators, but tells us nothing about how (or whether) those preferences play out in the behavior of courts and agencies. Without such knowledge, we have no way of testing the …


Structuring U.S. Innovation Policy: Creating A White House Office Of Innovation Policy, Stuart M. Benjamin, Arti K. Rai Jan 2009

Structuring U.S. Innovation Policy: Creating A White House Office Of Innovation Policy, Stuart M. Benjamin, Arti K. Rai

Faculty Scholarship

This article begins with a discussion of innovation’s importance to the future well-being of American society. The authors then discuss limitations of the current federal framework for making innovation policy. Specifically, the relative absence of innovation from the agenda of Congress and many relevant federal agencies manifests the confluence of two regulatory challenges: first, the tendency of political actors to focus on short-term goals and consequences; and second, political actors’ reluctance to threaten powerful incumbent actors. Courts, meanwhile, lack sufficient expertise and the ability to conduct the type of forward-looking policy planning that should be a hallmark of innovation policy. …


Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique Of Risk Assessment, Matthew D. Adler Jan 2005

Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique Of Risk Assessment, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis And The Pricing Of Fear And Anxiety, Matthew D. Adler Jan 2004

Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis And The Pricing Of Fear And Anxiety, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Risk assessment is now a common feature of regulatory practice, but fear assessment is not. In particular, environmental, health and safety agencies such as EPA, FDA, OSHA, NHTSA, and CPSC, commonly count death, illness and injury as costs for purposes of cost-benefit analysis, but almost never incorporate fear, anxiety or other welfare-reducing mental states into the analysis. This is puzzling, since fear and anxiety are welfare setbacks, and since the very hazards regulated by these agencies - air or water pollutants, toxic waste dumps, food additives and contaminants, workplace toxins and safety threats, automobiles, dangerous consumer products, radiation, and so …


Rule Of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness Rulemaking Responsibilities Of The Federal Banking Agencies, Lawrence G. Baxter Jan 1993

Rule Of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness Rulemaking Responsibilities Of The Federal Banking Agencies, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.