Law Commons^™

Signing Statements And Presidentializing Legislative History, John De Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz

Faculty Scholarship

Presidents often attach statements to the bills they sign into law, purporting to celebrate, construe, or object to provisions in the statute. Though long a feature of U.S. lawmaking, the President has avowedly attempted to use these signing statements as tool of strategic influence over judicial decision making since the 1980s — as a way of creating “presidential legislative history” to supplement and, at times, supplant the traditional congressional legislative history conventionally used by the courts to interpret statutes. In this Article, we examine a novel dataset of judicial opinion citations to presidential signing statements to conduct the most comprehensive …

Democratic Rulemaking, John M. De Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.

Regulatory Exit, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman

Faculty Scholarship

Exit is a ubiquitous feature of life, whether breaking up in a marriage, dropping a college course, or pulling out of a venture capital investment. In fact, our exit options often determine whether and how we enter in the first place. While legal scholarship is replete with studies of exit strategies for businesses and individuals, the topic of exit has barely been touched in administrative law scholarship. Yet exit plays just as central a role in the regulatory state as elsewhere – welfare support ends; government steps out of rate-setting. In this article, we argue that exit is a fundamental …

Responding To Agency Avoidance Of Oira, Nina A. Mendelson, Jonathan B. Wiener

Faculty Scholarship

Concerns have recently been raised that US federal agencies may sometimes avoid regulatory review by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In this article, we assess the seriousness of such potential avoidance, and we recommend a framework for evaluating potential responses. After summarizing the system of presidential regulatory oversight through OIRA review, we analyze the incentives for agencies to cooperate with or avoid OIRA. We identify a wider array of agency avoidance tactics than has past scholarship, and a wider array of corresponding response options available to OIRA, the President, Congress, and the courts. We argue …

The Crucial But (Potentially) Precarious Position Of The Chief Compliance Officer, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

This Article, written for a symposium on compliance issues in financial-services firms, focuses on the role of the chief compliance officer (“CCO”). Contrasting the position with that held by a firm’s general counsel or Chief Legal Officer (CLO), the article argues that a CCO’s position holds distinct challenges. Additionally, although internal compliance systems and personnel may be characterized as functional substitutes for external regulation, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of internal compliance requires a willingness to look deep within firms. The article argues that the law and regulation may enhance firms’ incentives to invest in effective internal compliance but may …

Simplifying The Standard Of Review In North Carolina Administrative Appeals, Sarah H. Ludington

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Regulatory Techniques And Liability Regimes For Asset Managers, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Marginalizing Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

A major focus of finance is reducing risk on investments, a goal commonly achieved by dispersing the risk among numerous investors. Sometimes, however, risk dispersion can cause investors to underestimate and under-protect against risk. Risk can even be so widely dispersed that rational investors individually lack the incentive to monitor it. This Article examines the market failures resulting from risk dispersion and analyzes when government regulation may be necessary or appropriate to limit these market failures. The Article also examines how such regulation should be designed,including the extent to which it should limit risk dispersion in the first instance.

Adaptive Regulation In The Amoral Bazaar, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

Twelfth Oliver Schreiner Memorial Lecture,delivered on 20 October 2010 at the School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Many gradual changes in science, law and society are crystallizing to shape a significant transformation in administrative law. The doctrinal framework within which Justice Schreiner himself attempted to modernize how law should regulate government and private economic activity seems from our vantage point to be quite antiquated. In explaining why, my examples will come from the world of financial services, but they could easily be found anywhere in the area of law and regulation. First I will outline the …

Leverhulme Lecture: The Future Of Securitization, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Lecture given November 11, 2010, the third of three delivered by Prof. Schwarcz as Leverhulme Visiting Professor of Law, Oxford University.

The securitization of subprime mortgage loans is widely viewed as a root cause of the financial crisis. This lecture balances the costs and benefits of securitization, focusing on what went wrong and on what needs to be fixed to curtail securitization’s abuses and make it viable again as an important financing tool. Finally, the lecture examines alternatives to securitization, focusing on covered bonds and comparing and contrasting covered bonds and securitization.

Leverhulme Lecture: The Global Financial Crisis And Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Lecture given November 9, 2010, is the first of three delivered by Prof. Schwarcz as Leverhulme Visiting Professor of Law, Oxford University. Prof. Schwarz examines the causes of the global financial crisis, showing it was triggered by market failures, not by financial institution failures, and arguing that any regulatory framework for managing systemic risk must address markets as well as institutions. The lecture also analyzes how regulation should be designed under that broader framework to mitigate systemic risk and its consequences. Finally, the lecture examines the potential systemic effects of sovereign debt crises, demonstrating how regulation can mitigate those effects.

Leverhulme Lecture: Regulating Complexity In Financial Markets, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Lecture given November 9, 2010, the second of three delivered by Prof. Schwarcz as Leverhulme Visiting Professor of Law, Oxford University.

Complexity is the greatest challenge to 21st Century financial regulation, having the potential to impair markets and investments in several interrelated ways. Furthermore, complexity can cause failures that individual market participants cannot, or will not have incentive to, remedy. These failures are driven by information uncertainty, misalignment of interests and incentives among market participants, and nonlinear feedback and tight coupling that result in sudden unexpected market changes. These are the same types of failures that engineers have long faced …

Book Review, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Reviewing, N. Scott Arnold, Imposing Values: An Essay on Liberalism and Regulation (2009)

Public Choice And Environmental Policy: A Review Of The Literature, Christopher H. Schroeder

Faculty Scholarship

This paper is a draft of a chapter for a forthcoming book, Research Handbook in Public Law and Public Choice, edited by Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, to be published by Elgar. It reviews the public choice literature on environmental policy making, first generally and then with respect to four fundamental environmental policy questions: (1) whether or not government action is warranted; (2) if it is, the scope and stringency of the government action, including the manner in which a bureaucracy will implement and enforce any statutory standards; (3) the level of government that assumes responsibility; and (4) the …

Administrative Law Agonistes, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger Noll, Barry R. Weingast, Daniel B. Rodriguez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Regulating Section 527 Organizations, Guy-Uriel Charles, Gregg D. Polsky

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Rule-Making And Policy Formulation In South African Administrative-Law Reform, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.